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A Comparative Analysis of the
Policy Foundations of New Communities:
Britain, United States, France, Australia

Ministry of State for Urban Affairs
September 1975
by: Sue Bisnaire

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...Volumes have been written on
urban growth policies, but little
has been accomplished. But one
idea whose time has come,...
is the concept of New Communities.

Samuel Jackson

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I Introduction

Urban growth strategies have been initiated in most western countries in response to population shifts, economic growth, social change, and technological innovations. The strategies assumed in each country have varied according to the issues of the period and the planning tools available. But there have been appearing signs that all countries are beginning to realize a need to pursue more comprehensive long term programs.

This is a study of new community initiatives, one aspect of the urban policy experience. It is a review of the new community policy foundations in four countries - Britain, United States, France, and Australia; with the objective of assessing them in light of their potential applicability to Canada. The major emphasis is placed on a discussion of the development of policy over time in terms of stated objectives, program implementation, and the explicit and implicit criteria used in each country to assess the effectiveness of the policy and programs in relation to stated goals.

The countries under study were selected for various reasons. Britain serves as an example of a country with mature urban systems highly regulated under a unitary form of government. Its publicly initiated new community program has reached its thirtieth year of operation and hence could provide

some valuable results of lessons learned over the long term. In contrast the United States is split federally like Canada and has opted for a private enterprise approach to new community building, with government initiatives that are limited in support and controls that are restricted generally to the prerequisite form. The French system of new city building is unlike the British and American in many ways, but particularly in its policy context. Finally Australia, a country closely paralleling Canada in terms of physical, political, and socio-economic environments, has just begun the task of planning new communities as part of their urban growth management strategy. It may provide some example of how federal-state relations have been defined in the context of organizing a new communities program.

The search for a common basis for new community initiatives at an international scale should not be over-emphasized. While many of the problems and policy responses may be similar in nature, each country has tailored its approach to unique political, social, and economic conditions as they have existed over time. This does not imply that a comparative analysis is invalid, but that care must be taken in generalizing about the approach initiated in each country since the complex processes that underlie urban development in each instance are not always explicit in the literature.

The remainder of the paper is structured in five major sections, four sections devoted to a discussion of the new community experience in each country, and a concluding summary and application section. The four descriptive sections are not structured identically but in terms of general discussion areas since the histories, problems and policies differ between countries and do not lend themselves to consistent treatment. The discussion areas include the following: a brief summary of the problem context of each country in terms of major urban issues; the policy response associated with new communities with emphasis on policy shifts over time; a synopsis of the explicit goals of the new community program and the evaluation of policy in light of these goals. In the concluding section, there will be an assessment of the foreign experiences in light of their potential application to Canada and a Canadian new communities program.

II Britain

2.1 Problem Statement

In Britain, the rapid development of urban policies became particularly evident in the 1930's and '40's in response to certain nationally recognized problems. The major issues included: the concentration of the nation's support systems in large urban centres, increased rural/urban migration, the rising costs of congestion and agglomeration, the increasing loss of good productive farmlands to sprawl, and the declining economic base in the peripheral regions of the country.¹ At the immediate local level, concern was centred on urban decay, high density unsound housing, health and sanitation problems, and urban renewal.

The response to these problems by government was a range of policies designed to promote change both on a local and national scale.

2.2 The Policy Response

Policy response generally dates from the Second World War when the problems of housing shortage and war torn city centres stimulated government action. Several key reports published early in the Forties established the framework for most of the post-war urban strategy.

The Royal Commission on the Distribution of Industrial Population published the Barlow Report in 1940

and commented on the trend towards increasing concentration of population and industrial activities in a few major urban centres.² The Commission listed the disadvantages of this concentration on strategic grounds (vulnerability to air attack), social grounds (poor housing quality,) and economic grounds (traffic congestion, high land costs, increased commuting time). In the Report was set out the first stage of a nation-wide plan, a plan aimed at implementing the following changes: industrial dispersal and relocation, reorganization of congested urban areas, increased balance between different regions with respect to size and variety of industrial activity, and the establishment of a national authority to oversee these problem areas and co-ordinate planning on a regional or local scale.

Two complementary reports, the Scott Committee Report (1941) on Land Utilization in Rural Areas which studied the effects of spreading urbanization on the rural economy, and the Uthwatt Committee Report, which examined the problem of Compensation and Betterment, together with the Barlow Report, all reflected the concern that existed for the problems of congested built-up areas.³

Two parallel strategies evolved from these studies: one based on the control of land use, and the other regulating the location of employment.⁴ The principal aim underlying the control of land use was to maximize efficiency of use while protecting environmental amenities. To do this required the subjugation of private rights to public interest, and this

generally took the form of urban planning, of which the new town movement was part. The second strategy aimed at regulating employment through the use of an industrial incentive program. The objective was to promote a regional "balance" in economic growth and employment opportunities by restricting industrial location in prosperous areas and encouraging it in economically deprived areas. As it will be seen later, the pursuit of the goal for balanced employment undermined the effective implementation of the new communities program.

2.2.1 Evolution of New Town Policy

The roots of new town policy extend back into the 19th century with the writings of Sir Ebenezer Howard.⁵ Howard saw garden cities as a means by which large cities could be decongested, and people could experience the advantages of both town and country living. Garden cities were envisaged as new towns large enough to allow efficient industrial organization and full social activity, but small enough that the inhabitants would have access to the greenbelt, a zone of open land with rural character surrounding the city. The land site was to be owned and administered in the interest of the community. F.J. Osborn, a disciple of Howard, wrote in 1918 and again in 1942:

There is little doubt that a population of 30,000 to 50,000 would be ample for most normal industrial purposes; on the present average scale of manufacture, it would permit a very considerable diversity of

industry within the town. The town would have an urban area of 800 hectares (2000 acres) and would be roughly round in shape, would have a radius of about a mile which would enable all of its industrial workers to be within walking or cycling distance of their work, of the town centre and of the open country, and an extensive rural community to have easy access to the markets and social attractions of the town.⁶

The earliest application of these ideals was in the construction of Letchworth (1903) and Welwyn Garden City (1920), both privately financed.

While neither garden city was initially too successful, the principles of new town design and the philosophy of a better existence for the working man, were firmly entrenched and remained intact into the 1940's and 1950's. Indeed the British prototype "new town" was conceived in terms of Howard's original sketches. The new town model that was implemented in later years was to be a self-contained community, large enough to ensure a high quality of services, independent in employment, and developed on land owned by public agencies.⁷ It was to be a town balanced internally in terms of urban activities, but with business and leisure links to other new towns and to a metropolitan centre. In the earlier years it was conceived as an element of metropolitan growth management, but in later years it became more a national policy for multiple purposes; that is, in addition to growth management, new towns were also seen as a means to

stimulate local economies and to provide housing for declining resource centres.

In 1944, with the publication of the Abercrombie Plan for Greater London, "new towns" became an official regional planning policy.⁸ The Plan's specified objective was to reduce the population of central London, and its recommendations included: (1) the physical containment of urban areas and reduction of densities in the inner cities; (2) the designation of greenbelts to preserve open space and facilitate containment; (3) the establishment of a ring of new towns around London to minimize sprawl and disperse excess population; and (4) strict limits on the location of industry in the London region.

For the purposes of this paper the most important aspect of the Plan was the proposal for the creation of eight ring towns to accommodate 383,000 residents. New town sites were designated in the Greater London area, however of the eight towns actually built, only two, Stevenage and Harlow, were of the first sites designated.

The Abercrombie Plan was first implemented through the creation of a Royal Commission in 1946 (headed by Lord Reith) of which the terms of reference were to:

...consider the general questions of the establishment, development, organization, and administration that will arise in the promotion of new towns in furtherance of a policy of decentralization from congested urban areas; and in accordance therewith to suggest guiding principles on which such towns should be established and developed as self-contained and balanced communities for work and living.⁹

The Commission did not consider part of its duty to weigh the merits of new towns in relation to the alternative of continued suburban development. Rather its terms of reference were only to determine a methodology by which new town policy could be implemented. Within nine months the Reith Committee had issued three reports. They contained a blueprint of the administrative and financial machinery needed for the creation of new towns, and recommendations concerning their size, layout, economic and social structure. These reports became the basis of the government's new town policy and guided the policy-makers in their introduction of the New Towns Act that was passed the same year.

The New Towns Act (1946) gave the Minister of Housing and Local Government and the Secretaries of State for Scotland and Wales power to designate any area of land, including an existing community, as a site for a new town. The procedure for the creation of a new town under the Act had three distinct components:

- (1) the designation of the site of the new town by the Ministry of Housing and Local Government;
- (2) the establishment of a Development Corporation to supervise the development of a new town to completion; and,
- (3) the extinguishment of the Corporation by the Minister upon the completion of the project and transfer of its powers to local authorities or statutory undertakers.¹⁰

One of the most significant aspects of the Act was that it made the new town development process a completely public operation. New towns were to be financed initially by grants and loans from the central government repayable over 60 years at varying interest rates, and development corporations were specifically prohibited from borrowing money from any other source. Initially these loans were set at 3 percent but raised to five percent for the first series of new towns. Additional support was to be available through complementary legislation such as the Housing Act. Income (commercial, industrial, residential rentals and leases) derived after development began was to be used as operating capital and to repay loans to the government. As a rule rents from the housing only covered loans for the actual land and building. Community facilities were to be supported by commercial and industrial income. In addition, low income housing was subsidized for £ 42 per unit annually over 60 years.¹¹

The New Towns Act supplemented its antecedent and enabled a New Towns Commission to oversee each new town upon its completion. An Act of 1965 has since updated both earlier acts.

Between 1946 and 1950 fourteen new towns were designated under the Act. Table II-1 provides a synopsis of their designation dates, size, proposed capacity and intended purposes.

The first eight new towns designated were intended primarily to accommodate overspill population from London. A second wave, called "provincial towns", were located throughout Britain and had a variety of purposes: the provision of housing to existing industrial areas, overspill for Glasgow, housing improvement, and growth stimulus for declining areas. All fourteen shared common attributes such as the emphasis on physical design, modest size (30,000 to 90,000), and public housing.

After 1950 there was a definite change in new town developments. New town designation, with the exception of Cumbernauld in Scotland (1955), came to a standstill. Government policy for control of overspill shifted towards encouraging extension of small towns in the southeast of England in accordance with the Town Development Act 1952.¹²

The local resistance which had occurred in almost every new town development scheme under the Act of 1946, and the failure to reach housing targets, were signals to the new Conservative government that a shift in programs was warranted. The Town Development Act 1952 was passed to aid the expansion of those conveniently situated country towns and rural districts which would provide substantial relief for congested cities.

BRITAIN




TABLE II-1

BRITAIN

NEW TOWNS 1946 - 1950

DESIGNATION, SIZE, OBJECTIVES

1st Series

New Towns			Population ('000's)		Proposed Capacity	Objectives
	<u>Ring Towns</u>		At desi- gnation	1973 (Dec.)		
1.	Stevenage	(1946)	7.0	74.0	105.0	Overspill
2.	Crawley	(1946)	10.0	71.0	79.0	"
3.	Hemel Hempstead	(1947)	21.0	73.0	80.0	"
4.	Harlow	(1947)	4.5	81.0	90.0	"
5.	Hatfield	(1948)	8.5	25.6	30.0	"
6.	Welwyn G.C.	(1948)	18.5	40.0	50.0	"
7.	Basildon	(1949)	25.0	83.7	140.0	"
8.	Bracknell	(1949)	5.0	40.0	55.0/60.0	"
<u>Provincial Towns</u>						
9.	Aycliffe	(1947)	0	24.0	45.0	Industrial Housing
10.	East Kilbride	(1947)	2.5	69.0	100.0	Overspill (Glasgow)
11.	Peterlee	(1948)	0	25.6	30.0	Housing Improvement
12.	Glenrothes	(1948)	1.1	31.5	70.0	Indus. hous- ing/growth centre
13.	Cwmbran	(1949)	12.0	43.2	55.0	Housing Improvement
14.	Corby	(1950)	15.7	51.2	83.0	Industrial Housing
TOTAL			130.8	732.8	1,012.0	

Source: The New Towns of Britain, British Information Services, London, September 1974, Appendix 2 "Some Facts and Figures", p. 27.

Rodwin wrote:

...The act authorizes development agreements to be made between exporting and reception areas, subject to the approval of the ministry. The arrangements can be quite varied. Before a proposal is submitted, it is expected that there will be the customary prior consultation with the appropriate agencies including the local planning authority and the government departments and public bodies concerned with development such as the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Transport, and the joint sewage and water boards. The agreements will fix the amount and kind of development, the specific reception areas, whether the exporting or reception authority will do the building and subject to what conditions, the financial assistance that will be given by the exporting authority or authorities... When the agreement in principle is reached, a preliminary scheme may be prepared and submitted to the Ministry. It would describe the proposal, the physical plan, the probable costs, the assistance to be rendered by the other authorities, and the estimated effect of the program on local finances.¹³

Under the Act, the Exchequer contributions based on the information provided, would be made only to assist in financing the initial development costs (sewer, water) and debt charges associated with them. Other costs (schools, health facilities, etc.) were assumed to be covered with income obtained after the development was completed.

While the receiving authority was normally expected to do the building, the act provided that the exporting authority could prepare the site, build housing and provide services for families outside its jurisdiction, especially if the receiving authority was unable or unwilling to develop. Those exporting authorities which participated, could serve either

as agents, in which cases the receiving authorities would purchase the land, pay all costs, own the houses and other buildings on completion; or serve as principals, in which cases they would own the houses and property until such time as an agreement would be made for the transfer of the property to the local authority.

The Act was important in that it encouraged utilization of the existing administrative machinery. No new agencies were to be created and the powers of existing local agencies were increased. The Act also offered incentives to encourage more balanced development and insisted upon prior administrative approval of the agreements as a condition for extending aid to receiving areas.

Despite the good intention towards a long range comprehensive development strategy, the government made no clear estimates of the possible scope and financial support of the program. This was in part because officials realized the costs would vary with different areas, leading to differences in equalization grants, local rates, housing subsidies, amount of commercial and industrial development, etc. Because of the limited assistance that could be expected from the exporting authority, the ministry's subsidies would control the scale of the program, and it was the uncertainty which prevailed about the intentions of the ministry that unsettled the local officials, and undermined the objectives of the statute. This was evident in the fact that more than two

years after the act passed, "no new town expansion scheme (had) been put in or even approved that was not already underway when the Act was passed."¹⁴ The government began to realize the financial complications and in 1955 the Minister of Housing and Local Government announced that fixed grants would be made to cover some of the increased costs of the receiving areas accommodating overspill population and industry. The grants were to represent 50 percent of the cost of approved water and sewerage extensions. Exporting authorities were assured that they would not be responsible for paying rate contributions (local subsidies) for housing in the development areas after a specified period (expected 10 years).

The Town Development Act was intended to encourage "match-making" between the exporting and receiving authorities. But in the London area there were a much larger number of the former than of the latter. In May 1953 there were approximately 27 receiving authorities while exporting authorities in the congested areas numbered 87.¹⁵ With the "direct assistance" approach it was evident that only a few authorities might benefit and not those most in need of assistance.

The Town Development Act represented the second channel through which new towns policy could be implemented. It retained many of the weaknesses of the earlier new towns

approach - misallocation of resources, inadequate planning organization, independence of industrial location policies, sterile physical design, and lack of research. However, the main strength of the Act was one of providing a greater choice of methods for new town building, particularly in the area of expanding existing communities, a policy to which the earlier acts were ill-suited. The Act also relied more upon local authorities. Instead of creating a new organization, as for new towns, the Town Development Act utilized local talent towards the objective of accommodating overspill population. Furthermore financial arrangements under the Act appeared to provide greater latitude - i.e. negotiation of shorter term loans at lower interest rates.

The 1961 census statistics indicated that the goals of stabilizing the population of London had not been reached. Population in the London area had increased at an unprecedented rate and the unpredicted increase of tertiary employment had undermined the entire industrial incentive scheme.¹⁶

A major shift occurred in the actual concept of new town; the shift was associated with size. Prior to the Sixties new towns were planned to house 50,000 to 70,000 inhabitants. But the later emphasis in policy was for towns of a larger scale with populations embracing a quarter million. The intent of this shift, to Mark III new towns, was to create

counter-magnets for growth in the London area and the policy itself found its ground-work in the proposals of the South-East Study published in 1964.¹⁷ The major emphasis of the proposals was to create three "new city" schemes located far enough from London to create independent growth centres, which would act as counter-magnets for London's growth. At the same time, stress was laid on the large-scale expansion of medium-sized towns throughout southeast England (such as Warrington, Peterborough, and Northampton). This latter policy proposed to link development to existing towns of a reasonable size, mainly to take advantage of existing facilities in the early stages of development. It was also realized that in promoting growth in existing centres, there would exist a ready supply of jobs and manpower, a strong administrative machinery, and a population structure that included young recent school graduates needed for office work. Furthermore the policy intended that modernization of the structure of the existing town could proceed side-by-side with new development.¹⁸ In 1967 the strategy for the southeast took on new dimensions - encouraging major growth "corridors" through the Greenbelt to secondary and major town expansion areas in the Region. The same year the government began to encourage 50 percent private development in new towns on the grounds that the trend towards much larger scaled development placed too much pressure on the house building capacity of the development corporation.

The Sixties then were a time when new town policy took a decidedly different twist: the initiation of new town schemes of larger scale, partially privately developed, with major emphasis on enlarging present urban centres. The containment of London was abandoned as a policy strategy. In its stead were initiatives to encourage urban development along special corridors.

Six new towns were designated between 1961 and 1966 and seven more between 1967 and 1971. Stonehouse was the last designated in August 1973. A profile of the second and third series of new towns is presented in Table II-2. In total 33 new towns have been designated in Britain under the New Towns Act - 21 in England, 2 in Wales, 6 in Scotland, and 4 in Northern Ireland. By the end of March 1974, some 228,000 new houses and flats had been built, 512 new schools, 3800 new shops, 2009 new manufacturing firms providing employment for about 188,000 people, and approximately 8,175,000 square feet of office space.¹⁹

By 1974 the total estimated capital expenditure for Great Britain in advancements and commitments had reached just over £1,105 million out of a total of £1500 million permitted under the Act. These figures underestimate the actual magnitude of commitment since funds are also invested by local authorities and private developers.²⁰

Over the same period significant progress in decentralization of metropolitan areas was achieved under the Town Development Act 1952. By the end of 1968, 66 town expansion schemes were being carried out in England, and an equal number in Scotland. Of those in England, half were associated with Greater London and fifteen with Birmingham. The building program under this Act had a target of 162,240 dwellings. By 1968, 56,669 were already built with 10,253 under construction. In addition, 25 million square metres of factory space had been built, two-thirds of which was for Greater London overspill.²¹

TABLE II-2

BRITAIN

NEW TOWNS 1960 - 1973¹

DESIGNATION, SIZE, OBJECTIVES

2nd Series

New Towns			Population ('000's)			
			<u>At desi- gnation</u>	<u>1973 (Dec.)</u>	<u>Proposed Capacity</u>	<u>Objectives</u>
15.	Cumbernauld	(1955)	3.5	36.3	100.0	Overspill (Glasgow)
16.	Skelmersdale	(1961)	10.0	37.7	80.0	Overspill (Liverpool)
17.	Livingston	(1962)	2.1	20.2	100.0	Overspill (Redistri- bution)
18.	Redditch	(1964)	32.0	45.0	90.0	Overspill (Birming- ham)
19.	Runcorn	(1964)	28.5	44.8	100.0	Redevelop- ment (Over- spill)
20.	Washington	(1964)	20.0	35.0	80.0	Growth Centre
21.	Irvine	(1966)	40.0	47.6	120.0	Growth Centre/ rural
22.	Newtown, Wales	(1967)	5.5	6.5	13.0	Growth Centre/ rural mi- gration

3rd Series

New Cities

23.	Milton Keynes	(1967)	40.0	61.0	250.0	Counter- magnet
24.	Peterborough	(1967)	80.5	94.4	185.0	Counter- magnet
25.	Northampton	(1968)	131.0	138.0	230.0	Counter- magnet

(Table II-2 Continued)

26.	Warrington	(1968)	124.0	132.0	230.0	Overspill Renewal
27.	Telford	(1968)	70.0	92.5	220.0	Overspill/ Renewal
28.	Central Lancashire	(1970)	235.0	240.5	430.0	Counter- magnet/re- newal
29.	Stonehouse	(1973)	7.9	7.9	70.0	Overspill (Glasgow)
TOTAL			830.0	1,079.4	2,298.0	

¹New towns were also designated in Northern Ireland - Araigavon (1965), Antrim (1965), Ballymena (1967), and Londonderry (1969), but were not included in this analysis.

Source: The New Towns of Britain, British Information Services, Central Office of Information, London 1974 "Facts and Figures Appendix 2, p. 27.

2.3 Goals of the British New Town Program

In Britain new town initiatives were the result of strong centralized planning at the national level. Goal formulation was in light of conditions that existed over time, and the actual emphasis that was applied by the central administrators was a function of their appreciation of the problems and of the resources available.

At the outset, new town goals were framed within the context of a national plan. New towns were to be used as vehicles to decentralize population from London and promote regional development. But the majority of goals were phrased in terms specific to new towns at a local level. The main problem was one of adopting a vehicle framed within the context of Howard's self-sufficient and "humane" garden cities, to a national scale for massive redistribution of population and economic activities. It is to the success or failure of this effort that one must now turn.

For the purposes of discussion British new town goals have been grouped into four categories: spatial, socio-economic, design, and environmental.

Spatial goals relate to changes in the spatial organization of population and activities in the country, i.e. the alteration of the development pattern on a national and regional scale.

Socio-economic goals include those goals that are strictly social (e.g. provision of amenities), or economic (e.g. financial return on investment), or indeed are a hybrid of the two (e.g. provision of employment and housing in the same location). Environmental goals relate to the implementation of a program which helps to protect, enhance, or conserve the natural environment both in the preventative and curative sense. Finally urban aesthetics, innovation, etc., are what could be termed design goals. These goals relate to the structuring or restructuring of the new town environment so as to maximize efficiency in terms of resource use and effectiveness in terms of human satisfaction. A similar differentiation of goal types will be made in the discussion of new community initiatives in the United States, France, and Australia.

The new towns program in Britain is characterized as having nine major goals. A summary of these goals is presented in Figure II-2. It is important to remember that not all these goals were pursued simultaneously to the same degree at the outset of the program. Those administrators who framed the goal set, also weighted its various components in terms of the political realities of the day.

Figure II - 2

BRITAIN

GOALS OF NEW COMMUNITY INITIATIVES

Spatial Goals

1. reversal of urbanization and decongestion of large urban areas, control of sprawl.

Socio-economic Goals

1. self-containment
 - . reduction of commuting time through provision of employment and housing in the same location.
2. creation of "balanced" communities
 - . maintain urban/rural balance of employment,
 - upgrade depressed areas,
 - stimulation of local economies through growth of regional centres,
 - creation of a diverse economic base, social balance in terms of class, age structure, etc.
3. financial return to new communities investment
4. increased standard of living, provision of community facilities, good quality housing, amenities.
5. creation of socially healthy communities

Environmental Goals

1. environmental preservation

Design Goals

1. testing and adapting innovative techniques
2. urban aesthetics

2.3.1 Spatial Goals

reversal of urbanization and decongestion of large urban areas, control of sprawl

The original objective of urban growth policies in the 1940's was to reverse the urbanization process and redirect growth away from the major urban areas. This goal was institutionalized through programs to decentralize economic activity and population from London and other centres such as Birmingham, and encourage it in small distant new towns. Two schemes were introduced to encourage decentralization - an industrial incentive program and public housing program, the latter of which will be discussed in a later section.

The industrial incentive scheme was a central part of the new communities program for the British planners felt in order to encourage people to move from London, that employment had to be available. But in reality the scheme was independent of the new town administration, for it was under the direction of the Board of Trade.

Under the incentive scheme any firm wishing to establish or enlarge an industry had to first obtain an industrial development permit for construction exceeding a certain minimum floor space. At the same time more positive incentives were created: (1) priority economic development areas; (2) regional employment premiums; and (3) capital subsidies. The measures changed frequently over the years as

did the designated areas. In later years there was a gradual increased recognition of the tertiary sector, and in 1963, the Location of Offices Bureau was established to control office building construction similar to the way industries were regulated.

At the same time planning controls, greenbelt legislation, conservation areas, and agricultural preservation laws were combined to exert a rigorous control over the release of rural land for urban expansion.

Was the pattern of urbanization changed, and were the core areas decongested? Was sprawl contained? The answer to these questions is yes, - to a limited extent.

Bourne comments:

...While they (new towns) have taken less than 10 percent of post-war urban population growth and currently receive less than 3 percent of the nation's housing construction the benefits in large part have gone to a particularly important group - residents of the congested inner city.

He adds further:

...Their (the new town's) success at the regional level in influencing the shape of population distribution comes largely from the fact that the policy was in direct but not anticipated, accord with established spatial trends towards urban decentralization²²

But his figures for growth indicate a somewhat less than successful campaign at the national level. This in part could be attributed to the fact that the national growth rate and rate of economic and technological change had increased beyond anticipation.

If this were true, it is possible to concede that new towns as implemented were both insufficient in size and number.

2.3.2 Socio-economic goals

self-containment

The concept of a self-contained new town has been accepted since the earliest writings of Howard, and the phrase itself has appeared so often in conjunction with new town philosophy, that it has become one of its identifying features and one of the primary goals of British new town planning. For example a typical definition of a new town reads:

...a town deliberately planned and built, a self-contained town: a town which provides in addition to houses, employment, shopping, education, recreation, culture - everything which makes the independent, satisfying town.²³

While the concept itself was apart of the Garden City movement, it matured as one of the main goals of the new town program between the two world wars. Its advocates translated self-containment in terms of housing and employment. There was an attempt to balance "total employment" with "total housing" so that "in" and "out" commuting would be minimized. This implied two further conditions: first, new towns

located distant enough from metropolitan areas so as to render savings from the elimination of commuting; and second, a mix of occupations among residents that would match the occupational demands of the town's industry.

Implementing a policy to procure this goal required control over the occupancy of residences by allocating new town housing only to people with jobs in the town.

The aim of self-contained communities... dominated the procedure adopted for allocating housing. The main feature of these procedures was that employment came first. It was generally possible to get housing in one of the London new towns only if there was a job there to go to.²⁴

Several factors led planners to believe this goal was attainable. First because housing shortages were so critical, it was felt that people had little choice but to work and live in the same town because that was the way the alternative was presented to them. Once in the town the people were under a constraint to stay there because of the housing supply. Secondly, if a person did move, the corporation controlled who came to the new town and who would occupy the vacant dwelling. Corporations attempted to restrict sales to those with jobs in the town. This proved particularly effective since they owned 80 percent of the new town housing. Thirdly, when the new Towns Act was first implemented, only one in ten persons owned cars. Hence there was virtually no commuting.

In view of the rigid controls over the allocation of housing in new towns and inducements made to industry to locate there, one might expect new towns to be generally self-contained in terms of housing and employment. Did this happen?

The conventional criterion used to measure employment self-sufficiency was the job ratio; that is, the employment level in a town divided by the number of residents in employment in the area expressed as a percentage. When the ratio equalled 100, the town was said to be self-contained in an "employment sense".

A.A. Ogilvy in 1968 analyzed figures to determine how far a balance had been achieved. In the study, which included the eight London new towns, Ogilvy found that with the exception of the towns of Hatfield and Welwyn Garden City, that the towns by 1961 had almost equal proportions of jobs and working population as measured by the job ratio.²⁶ Furthermore, in a comparison between the older towns of Hertfordshire and the new towns, he found that over the decade 1951 to 1961, that new towns became more balanced (75% were within the range 80 to 120) whereas older towns became less balanced i.e. in employment centres the job ratios rose higher than 120 while in dormitory centres the trend was towards job ratios below 80. The job ratio as a criterion

to measure self-containment was incomplete in that it measured only potential self-sufficiency and not actual. The potential could only be realized if both employment and habitation were inter-related. As it was, Ogilvy found a substantial amount of cross-movement, with residents working outside the town and with town jobs filled by "in-commuters". In 1961, the proportion who worked outside the towns varied generally between 23 and 40 percent (Stevenage lower at 14%; Hatfield higher at 62%). The percentage of employers who lived outside the towns ranged from 21 to 38 percent (Harlow lower at 13%; and Hemel Hempstead lower at 18%). With several exceptions then between 1 and 4 of 10 residents worked outside, and a similar proportion lived outside.

These findings led Ogilvy to say:

...it is doubtful whether any of the new towns can be called self-contained, even in respect of employment. Large numbers of new town residents travelled out to work in other areas, and large numbers of new town jobs were filled by people who lived elsewhere. Cross movements in and out of new towns were still considerably higher than the small amounts necessary to balance numbers of jobs and working population. ...the attractive force of towns much smaller and nearer (than London) was responsible for most of the cross-travelling... The analysis suggests that the daily interchange of population between new towns and surrounding districts is likely to increase in the future, in the same way that work-travel movements have increased in recent years around new towns. There is a growing awareness that the words "self-sufficiency" are no longer appropriate.²⁷

At the time of initial implementation of the new communities program, this goal above all others was stressed

by the central government. However over time, while self-containment still remained important, certain factors undermined the attempt to achieve it. These factors included: a marked increase by 1960 of the number of households possessing automobiles (50 percent), the rise of secondary wage-earners in families, and the trend towards more owner-occupied housing in new communities in response to occupant demands.

creation of "balanced" Communities

The goal of "balance" for new towns related to a number of ideas which can be differentiated for analysis purposes as to economic balance or social balance. Economic balance referred to a number of objectives. On the regional level the major objective was to maintain an urban/rural balance of employment and upgrade depressed areas. Economic balance was also stressed in the context of stimulating local economies through the growth of regional centres. At the local level it referred to providing an economic base not dominated by a single firm, and a structure of employment conducive to attracting a variety of workers and employment opportunities. Social balance, in the context of British new town planning, referred to the development of communities with all social classes and age structures represented.

"economic balance"

When the policy was first introduced it was hoped that new towns would help produce a more optimum distribution of employment and population at both the intra - and inter-regional level. At the intra-regional level the problem was seen as the decentralization of population and employment from London. In 1951 the employment imbalance (difference between level of employment and number of residents in employment) was just less than 200,000. In attempting to eliminate the imbalance, industry was redirected to new towns through the Board of Trade program and population was encouraged to relocate through the housing scheme.

The statistics indicate that most new towns were able to attract industry. By the end of March 1974 over 2000 new manufacturing firms had been established providing employment for 188,000 people.²⁸

However in spite of these optimistic figures, new towns failed to reduce the imbalance between employment and population. By 1966 the employment surplus had increased by over 150,000. The failure was attributed to two factors. First, planners in the 1940's and 1950's failed to forecast the population growth trends of London realistically. They believed that over time population growth would stabilize and even decline as a result of new town relocation incentives. But the population increased at an unanticipated rate, and the

movement to surrounding areas had a smaller effect than expected. Second, there was a failure to recognize the importance of office employment. Early new town strategies were based on the premise that only industry would be decentralized. Little consideration was given to the effect of growth in office jobs in the London area. In 1962 the annual rate of growth of office employment was about 15,000, or over one percent of total employment.²⁹ To discourage further expansion of this sector the government introduced a system of office permits in the London region, modelled after the industrial development certificate. This legislation was extended to the Birmingham area (1965) and to the whole of the South-East and Midland (1966).

But the fact that South-East England already contained three-quarters of all new offices points out the difficulty of effecting a policy of decentralization of employment when a uniform system of control was not applied. It also points to the need to focus on the incentive side of policy by proposing measures to encourage office and industrial activities in new towns accompanied by measures to restrict growth in non-desirable areas.

New towns were also used as tools to upgrade depressed areas, in particular those areas experiencing a decline in industrial activity due to slumps in the primary extractive sector. Peterlee and Glenrothes were two such areas.

The purpose of these communities was to provide new housing for the existing residents and establish a more diversified economic base.

New towns policy was effective in achieving this goal. For example in Glenrothes, the number of industrial firms was increased from 4 at designation (1948) to 141 by 1974.³⁰ While it could not be claimed that the unemployment rate was substantially lower than the national average, if new industry had not been attracted so successfully through the industrial incentive scheme (which had designated many of the depressed areas for development), then the number unemployed would have been substantially higher.

Development corporations were aware of the need to encourage a diversity of economic activities to achieve a balanced community. It was felt that a variety of firms would lessen any potential impact of economic difficulties. In certain new towns, industrial diversity could be ensured through a screening of potential industrial clients by the development corporation. For example in Crawley, over 600 firms were interested in locating, and the corporation could thus ensure employment diversity through their licensing procedures. Indeed, it was the central government's policy that no industry should employ more than 10 percent of the working population so as to avoid a one-industry dominated community. But this policy hindered industrial employment

in other centres such as Harlow since unlike Crawley, it found fewer firms attracted to its site. In other areas, the quest to secure a variety of industries was hampered by the development incentive system which promoted industrial location only in specified areas of the country.

In spite of certain constraints, some of the new communities appear quite successful in promoting a diverse economic base. For example, in Skelmersdale after only five years of development, a variety of industrial firms have been attracted which include metal-working, engineering and electronics, and others which manufacture products such as rubber goods, plastic containers, clothing, etc.

The original plans for the new towns were particularly dogmatic about the employment quota, the programs implemented being generally oriented towards basic industry. For instance in the London new towns, one job in industry and one in tertiary employment was allowed for every four inhabitants, and this corresponded to a slightly above average employment level (42%), and to a rate of industrial employment higher than the average for London. During the construction period of these new towns, industrial employment averaged about 25 percent of the total population, rising to 28 percent by 1968.³¹ In the provincial towns associated with already existing industrial or mining activities, the rate declined from 40 percent at designation to 19 percent in 1968. In a general sense, without

reflecting specifically on the problems of one town or another, the goal of creating more than 200,000 jobs was reached.

While progress towards industrial diversity was evident, the same cannot be said for tertiary employment. The lack of tertiary jobs in the early period of new community growth was a function of the policy directions at the time. Office work was considered unnecessary for the initial ten years of a new town's existence, and this was reflected in the fact that only 1.8 percent of the population was employed in office buildings as of 1968.³² The low proportion of jobs available in this tertiary sector led to much "out-commuting" from the new towns, thus affecting the degree to which self-containment could be realized.

Employment opportunities were also accounted for by the commercial sector which developed in the towns. An average of one shop to 80 residents was provided in the initial stages of development and later was changed in 1967 to one for every 150.³³ But the lag in construction meant that commercial employment opportunities were not available until the town development scheme was well in motion.

TABLE II-3
BRITISH NEW TOWNS
ECONOMIC BASE

TOWNS				
	Before designa- tion		Completed Dec. 1974	
<u>London Ring</u>	Firms	Employees	Firms	Employees
Basildon	20	438	185	20,966
Bracknell	7	179	74	9,589
Crawley	23	1,529	93	18,319
Harlow	6	333	302	20,450
Hatfield	8	900	20	1,568
Hemel	36	6,200	77	14,000
Hempstead				
Stevenage	5	1,700	49	16,200
Welwyn G.C.	69	10,000	24	4,002
TOTAL	174	21,279	824	105,094
OTHERS				
Aycliffe	97	8,994	-	-
C. Lancaster	380	55,000	-	-
Corby	3	-	55	5,720
Milton Keynes	86	12,000	102	-
Northampton	419	29,200	153	6,220
Peterborough	-	23,000	-	4,800
Peterlee	-	-	49	4,100
Redditch	108	12,600	235	5,812
Runcorn	30	8,000	81	3,775
Skelmersdale	12	981	100	10,600
Telford	100	15,000	232	20,800
Warrington	-	32,800	13	475
Washington	10	3,614	186	7,795
Cwmbran	20	6,800	110	5,053
Newtown, wales	7	900	27	815
Cumbernauld	3	171	149	7,400
E. Kilbride	3	314	306	19,410
Glenrothes	4	1,884	141	8,979
Irvine	58	6,000	81	7,000
Livingstone	3	70	74	5,570
Stonehouse	6	790	-	-
TOTAL		239,397	2,918	229,418

Source: Evans H., New Towns: The British Experience,
p. 176-177

"social balance"

Social balance in terms of producing a mixed population, was an extremely important goal during the early years and has continued to dominate planning policies since. It was conceived of as a reproduction of some standard demographic and employment structure within the confines of the new community neighbourhoods and in the town as a whole. In terms of measurement criteria then, the characteristics of new town population with respect to age, occupation and class were to mirror national averages, averages which included all those living in England, Scotland, and Wales.

The attainment of this goal was considered to be difficult particularly since implicit in the goal was advocated an indiscriminate mixing of dwellings, a condition which had not evolved in older communities of comparable size. Social mixing at a neighbourhood level was to be fostered by the clustering of families of similar social class in sub-units, and by providing certain facilities such as coffee houses, taverns, and parks, which would attract all classes and cross-cut normal social segregation.

For the purposes of evaluating the extent to which this goal was achieved, certain indicators have been identified: i.e. standard population comparisons of age, household size, and occupational class.

The age structure in new towns was initially very young. Twice as many young children were found in the first designated towns as in the population of the country as a whole, and a higher number of young adults but fewer adolescents (half the national proportion), middle aged people (33% to 25% less), and senior citizens (16% less). This could be explained by the fact that young families seeking suitable accommodation, were lured more successfully to new towns. More spacious housing also provides an explanation as to why families were generally larger than average, 3.69 people/family in Crawley (1965) and 3.52 at Harlow (1961).³⁴ Over time however, as the population aged, there was a general trend towards approaching national averages.

The class structure of certain new town populations has been recently studied by J. Heraud. In comparing occupational class structures for Hemel Hempstead, Crawley, and Harlow with average figures for England and Wales and Greater London, he came to the conclusion that the skilled manual/unskilled non-manual category was over-represented in new towns. The percentage falling into this category ranged from 54.6 percent in Hemel Hempstead to 63.6 percent in Crawley, compared to an average of 51.1 percent in England and Wales and 52.2 percent in Greater London.³⁵

TABLE II-4

BRITAIN

CLASS STRUCTURES OF SELECTED
NEW TOWNS (%)*

Social Classes	Crawley (1961)	Harlow (1957)	Hemel Hempstead (1960)	England/ Wales	Greater London
1. Professional	3.7	5.0	5.9	3.8	4.8
2. Intermediate Professional	13.4	13.0	20.1	15.4	15.8
3. Unskilled non- manual and skilled manual	63.3	63.0	54.6	51.1	52.2
4. Semi-skilled manual	13.1	19.0	14.5	20.5	18.1
5. Unskilled manual	6.2		5.0	9.2	9.1
Middle class (1 2)	17.1	18.1	26.0	19.2	20.6
Working class (3,4,5)	82.9	82.0	74.0	80.8	79.4

Source: B.J. Heraud, "Social Class and The New Towns", Urban Studies,
Vol. 5, No. 1 Feb. 1968, p. 39.

*represent occupational class of heads of household of subsidized dwellings but exclude private and new non-subsidized dwellings. Scale used is that of the Registrar Generals Classification of Occupations, a method of Classification used by the New Town Development Corporations.

Cresswell and Thomas attributed this over-representation by the skilled manual workers as a function of the housing allocation procedures. They stated:

...Initially many of the development corporations allocated housing on a personal basis. Any person who obtained a job in the town could apply for a development corporation dwelling. But in the London region ... where there was a particularly acute housing shortage, this system led to a situation where individuals would take up a job in order to get a house in the town - and then change their jobs. As a result of this, by the late 1960's all of the London new towns operated an allocation system which required nomination by the employer - each employer was given a quota of housing for a given period. With a system of this kind, it seems inevitable that employers will discriminate in favour of key workers and thereby discriminate against unskilled workers. In this way the housing allocation procedures certainly seemed to have favoured the skilled manual worker.³⁶

This allocation problem led to a criticism by many that underprivileged were under-represented in the new communities. Cresswell and Thomas comment further:

... in practice it seems likely that the underprivileged have found it more difficult than other groups to get a job in a new town, more difficult to get nominated for a house if they did manage to get a job in the town, and, of course, more difficult to pay the relatively high rent of a new dwelling.³⁷

Without further information concerning the provincial towns, it might be misleading to conclude that the British new towns as a whole achieved class-balance. Figures for the

three towns surveyed by Heraud indicate that the London ring towns did succeed in achieving a relatively balanced class structure. For other new towns, particularly those serving as dormitory centres for nearly industrial concentrations (e.g. Peterlee), the comparison with national averages would be deceiving and impractical.

One of the sub-objectives associated with the general theme of social balance was the balance of class composition at the neighbourhood level. Again, Heraud provides the only data available on this aspect in the analysis of Crawley's neighbourhood structure.³⁸ Generally he found that the neighbourhoods built in the early stage of town development had predominantly working class populations, whereas "newer" neighbourhoods had proportionately more middle class representation. This was reasoned to be a result of town growth, and the changing pattern of labour requirements.

More middle class workers were attracted to Crawley during the later stages of development when a demand for a greater range of occupations began to emerge.

TABLE II-5
CLASS CHARACTERISTICS OF
IMMIGRANTS (%)

CRAWLEY NEW TOWN

	Entering 1948-52	Entering 1957-60
*Classes 1&2	17	25.6
3	62	62.8
4&5	21	11.6
Total	100	100

Source: B.J. Heraud, "Social Class and the New towns"
ibid., p. 46

* Middle class (1&2)
Working class (3,4,5)

But Heraud also attributed homogenization of neighbourhoods to be a result of the natural tendency for social segregation; that is, the tendency for a large number of families to move from neighbourhood to neighbourhood and so settle in an area constituted of people with similar social class. Furthermore he comments that this phenomenon has begun to occur in areas surrounding new towns. The "suburban" neighbourhoods and local adjacent towns have become predominately middle class, whereas the working class are becoming more evident in the town centres and industrial areas considered less desirable. To a great degree this segregation has occurred because of the policies of the Development Corporation. The upper classes have been given a choice of moving elsewhere in the town through the policy of unsubsidized house building, a policy which represents a drastic change from the philosophy of social mixing which the original new town programme spelt out.

It can be stated with some qualifications previously mentioned, that class heterogeneity on a town level was generally achieved, but that at the neighbourhood level there was a trend towards social homogeneity. This raises some doubts as to the application of the goal of social balance to new towns when defined so specifically to a neighbourhood level. Gans has remarked that in a heterogeneous community there are financial advantages of high rate assessments from high income areas which can be

redistributed in the form of improved education and community facilities, and that to some extent inter-group tensions may be resolved through close proximity of groups. However heterogeneity at a local level may indeed promote more conflict than cohesion.³⁹

In conclusion it appears realistic to assume that with larger more diversified new communities now as policy instruments, that social balance will be more a matter of course rather than a deliberate manipulation of housing and people. As a variety of jobs are encouraged and as private industry is induced to provide a range of dwelling types, social balance will be implicitly achieved.

financial return to new communities investment

It was expected during the initial years of new town construction that substantial front-loading charges would be incurred by the public authority. The development corporation was to receive long-term loans at low interest rates to offset the early high capital outlays. Once houses were built, and industries and commercial enterprises operating, the new town schemes were expected to be revenue generating. The rule of thumb was such that it took fifteen years for the corporation to be in a profit-making situation.

The major indicator used to measure achievements of this goal has been the profit/loss position of each of the development corporations. As of March 1974, of the first fourteen new towns designated, only Peterlee and Glenrothes did not have a profit picture. The financial results for 28 new towns in Britain signified a net profit of £ 4.869 million. net capital advances totalled £ 1.155 million at rates of interest ranging from 5.12 percent to 12.01 percent.⁴⁰

Over the long run new towns may become profitable investments from a profit/loss standpoint. The Commission for new towns reported in 1971 that investment in industrial and commercial assets in Crawley, Hatfield, Hemel Hempstead, and Welwyn Garden City amounted to some £ 27 million. The income from these assets in the year 1970/71 represented a return on gross investment of 10 per cent, or 8.1 per cent after deducting expenses.⁴¹ These figures may be indicative only of

returns on capital investments which were financed when interest rates were relatively low and hence may overstate the financial picture. In the twelve years since the Commission was established there has accumulated an operating surplus of £ 45.3 million for the transferred communities.

increased standard of living

The intention of the London new towns was that they should provide homes for the lower class Londoners and improve their standard of living. Because of the industrial relocation program, and the types of workers attracted to the new towns (or brought with the firm when it moved), many of the new-comers were from the fringe area of London.

The new residents did appear to benefit from a better standard of living - 95-98 percent of the people in the London new towns had exclusive use of an internal toilet while the comparable figure for Greater London was 73.9 percent!⁴ New towns after completion were seemingly well-equipped, with facilities for education, recreation, and medical care. Furthermore the design criteria used were intended to ensure health and safety in the new community. That is not to say that the increased standard of living was without costs.

In Crawley and Stevenage rent represented 13.6 percent of net income, compared to a national average of 9.2 percent. But the added space per unit, and other amenities perhaps could have attributed to this differential.

Creation of socially healthy communities

As the initial new towns were complete, and residents moved in, it was evident that there might be problems of social adjustment to a new environment. This has commonly become referred to as the "new town blues".

The cause of the discontent was seemingly related to a number of factors: lack of employment opportunities for secondary wage-earners, the lag in construction of community facilities, isolation from other centres and former friends.

Over time as new community facilities were constructed and social activities organized, the towns gradually gained atmosphere and character. Many seemingly were more satisfied, for the 1970 the average estimated turnover rate for the London new towns was 3.1 percent, and for the other newer towns 8.1 percent. A survey taken at Skelmersdale reported 84.5 percent of the residents happy about their move to the new community.

2.3.3 Environmental goals

Environmental preservation

The protection of the environment and the prevention of pollution were considerations of the new town planning process. In Craigavon, a study of conservation was prepared by the development corporation in 1970 to ensure environmental quality was maintained during construction. At Telford, the development corporation set out a series of plans to overcome the problems of dereliction and reclamation associated with the extractive activities there. Similarly at Warrington, efforts have been made to control all types of pollution threatening the town - atmospheric pollution from industry, car exhaust, pollution of land and water from chemical fertilizers, pesticides, industrial affluent and sewage. The study group comprised representatives from the development corporation, local authorities, water works, public health inspectors, etc.

2.3.4 Design goals

Testing/adapting innovative techniques

The aim of early new town planners was to reconstruct the urban environment and provide something better than the "squalor of the old industrial town". Many new concepts were introduced - terraced housing, pedestrians malls, bus-ways, etc. With each successive group of new towns

over the years, design assumptions had to be changed to reflect new values. For example the growth in car ownership led to the development of new housing forms and methods of arranging garaging. But in many ways the early planners adapted design in a post facto manner in reaction to rather than in anticipation of changing conditions.

While many new techniques were tried, the actual physical planning guidelines discouraged much innovation. The New Towns Committee had established quantitative standards for all sectors of the community and in attempting to meet these targets, some imaginative design was foregone.

The change of the scale in new town developments and the increased mixture of densities has encouraged greater use of innovative techniques in more recent years.

urban aesthetics

Another goal of the new town program was to create a pleasing and appealing environment for living - i.e. an aesthetic environment. In many respects this was presupposed by early planners to mean new housing and community facilities arranged in an orderly and efficient manner with provision for a sizeable area of urban open space. But if aesthetics were defined in terms which included varied and diverse use of space, then the new communities that were built as part of the first series of new towns did not represent such.

This was attributed to three factors. First the quantitative goals set for housing construction meant that many buildings had to be built in a short time span at least possible cost. Cost controls, necessary particularly because of the totally public nature of the financing scheme, meant restrictions in terms of amenities and variation. Up until the 1960's the major effect lay in the constraints on internal design. From that time on, major restrictions were on exterior physical design. The cost ceilings limited types of materials used and hence the potential variety available. Secondly, the provision of facilities and housing at the outset was under the complete control of one development corporation whose success in new town construction was measured in terms of meeting the official guidelines. In most cases this success was measured in quantitative rather than qualitative criteria. Thirdly because all of the housing in the new towns was publically owned and administered, there was less incentive for residents to initiate the type of upkeep and improvements imparted by private ownership. Hence the "sameness" in design was not "camouflaged" by individual initiative.

Over time lessons were learned from early experiences and changes have been made which have helped to provide greater aesthetic appeal to new community townsites. Private enterprise has been encouraged to undertake greater initiative in the provision of housing, and recent architectural competitions for private enterprise housing have added greater variation and innovations to the use of space. Half the new housing is in the form of housing for sale. Variety in housing design is being introduced at an aggregated unit scale, and consultants are being used more intensively to encourage more "texture" in the newer townsites. Likewise the general improvement in industrial and commercial buildings in the new towns has contributed to more aesthetic surroundings. New materials, sharp colours, sculptured forms are increasingly used and indeed provide a progressive example to non-new town areas. The contribution of new towns lies in the scale and quality of landscaping, the care given to details, and the high standards required. Indeed the development corporations have established precedents in design, setting the tone for the custom-built dwellings of individual private firms.

2.4 Summary

The British have developed a relatively comprehensive set of policies for the regulation and the redistribution of growth. The policy dimensions may be summarized as follows: 1) limit of the physical extension of cities

through land use controls and greenbelts, and the relocation of this growth into new and expanded towns; and 2) limit on the location of industry and office space in existing congested areas, and their redirection to declining areas through a certificate and incentive scheme. Regulation of urban growth through new community incentives has been facilitated by a highly centralized political system, coordinated administrative approach, and a broad consensus on the problems of urbanization and the role that new communities would play in the restructuring of urban growth.

Furthermore there has been agreement on the ideal form for new cities, and this has helped in the translation of goals into policies.

The results of this policy implementation have been most obvious at the local level. The British have been relatively successful in the long-run in regulating the marginal growth of major conurbations and in reducing the economic impact of changes in technology in the depressed rural areas. They also have succeeded considerably in providing well-balanced and economically viable new towns and expanded centres.

It is not obvious however whether the success of the new towns program and industrial incentive scheme was at the expense of individual freedom, (because of the elitist approach taken), or if the ultimate result was the

most economically rational from a scarce resource standpoint.

Finally, it is not clear to what degree the long established strategies for industrial location and new-town planning have been converging on a focus that is both local and national, and whether the present system as it stands, respects the inter-relatedness of location decisions in a local/regional/national context.

Footnotes

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III UNITED STATES

3.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT

The main problems faced by the American Federal government have been that of rapid urbanization and segregation. Although the annual increase in population had been decreasing in the nation as a whole, massive redistribution of people internally had reached such a level that by 1968, nearly two-thirds of the nation's population had settled in metropolitan areas.¹ By 1975 it was expected that some 75 percent would be concentrated in urban centres.

This massive growth has been characterized by very distinctive trends. As low income people from rural areas moved to the central cities in search of work, education, and other opportunities, they settled in the core areas. As a result the central city core has become overcrowded, unhealthy, economically unviable, and unsafe. Furthermore these areas have become inhabited predominantly by disadvantaged groups - blacks, immigrants, etc.² At the same time higher income groups moved to the suburban areas, which were growing rapidly due to population influx and industrial expansion. The

suburban areas have since grown to such proportion that they are almost as overcrowded as the core areas and are experiencing diseconomies.

From these overriding problems have developed concerns for stemming urban growth and for integrating cities racially in order to curb the social and economic trends that are creating two separate societies in the United States.

3.2 THE POLICY RESPONSE

Up until the mid-1960's there was little initiative to formulate policies to regulate and structure urban growth. Some programs had been devised to improve urban and rural living, but these were very sectoral in nature, relating to such fields as housing, transportation, employment, etc. Often these programs worked at cross-purposes and more often than not had little positive influence on the urbanization process.

The ^{formation} ~~transportation~~ in public concern was sudden. The late Sixties witnessed a frenzy of activity. Many reports were published by various bodies - the Department of Agriculture, the National Advisory Committee on Civil Disorder, the Kerner Commission, both the Democratic and Republican Parties.³ All called for increased commitment and organized response to overcome the nation's urban problems, and all made reference to the inclusion of a scheme of new communities to absorb growth, create housing and employment simultaneously, and relieve the pressures on the major urban areas.

3.2.1 Evolution of New Community Policy

Emphasis on new community planning and development began during the 1920's with two attempts to imitate the

British Garden City concept. Sunnyside Gardens, located in New York City, and Radburn, N.J. were the first private efforts to develop new communities.

With the exception of U.S. Housing Corporations efforts to create houses in response to war shortages, federal involvement in new community construction began in the 1930's when the New Deal Government established the Greenbelt program under the authority granted by the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act.⁴ The Act itself did not provide official support for new communities, but the Resettlement Administration was created under its general housing powers. The Resettlement Administration was to develop eight new communities for the purpose of providing employment opportunities to alleviate depression, and for testing some of the innovative concepts first introduced at Radburn and Sunnyside Gardens. The towns were to contain high density low income housing but Congress only appropriated \$31 million of the \$68 million requested, and in the end, only three communities were actually developed - Greenbelt Maryland, Greenhills Ohio, and Greendale Wisconsin.

The Greenbelt program initiated by the federal government was a program whereby the Resettlement Administration selected the sites, acquired land, planned, financed, constructed and managed the communities. The criterion for site selection was proximity to major centres, and the

rationale for it was the advantage of a stable employment base. In designating sites, no provision was made for regional development goals nor local site review. The federal land was exempt from local zoning restrictions and taxing powers. However Congress authorized payments in lieu of taxes in the amount equal to the cost of municipal services provided.

The first federal attempts to initiate new community development were not overly successful. Shortage of money for financing crippled attempts to meet large scale housing shortages, and less than 1000 housing units were built in these Greenbelt communities. There were also a minimal number of schools, commercial, and community facilities built. Furthermore there was little success in achieving a social or economic balance in the towns.

With the end of the war, interest in new communities waned. Between 1949-1953 the federal government liquidated its assets in the projected developments and sold undeveloped land.

Some ten years after the Greenbelt developments, a series of privately sponsored new communities emerged. Between 1947 and 1969 some 63 new communities were completed or under construction in 20 states.⁵ The first, Park Forest, adopted many of the Greenbelt principles, and introduced in its own right the concept of a regional shopping centre to form the hub of the community. Later Reston Virginia and Columbia Maryland were built and became the prototype new communities for America -

planned large-scale efforts designed to provide for 10,000 or more over a 10 to 20 year period and under the control of one developer.

The privately built new communities, of which Reston, Columbia, and Park Forest can be considered examples, ranged from 1,200 to 53,800 acres. With some exceptions the residents of these communities were mostly middle income groups, young to middle age, and white. The communities contained almost all market housing, with little to no subsidized public housing that would help to achieve a degree of social diversity. Hence they were not new towns in the sense that the British envisioned; balanced communities with a complete range at employment, social facilities, and housing choice. By the year 2000, if these communities achieve target populations, it is expected that 3,474,000 will be accommodated in 1,066,800 dwelling units on 566,300 acres.⁶

In 1966 the government saw the need to promote new community construction through loan guarantees, and this led to a new era of federally supported new community projects.

In that year the federal government amended the National Housing Act (1965) by creating Title X, a section which was to provide mortgage insurance to private developers for the purchase of raw land and the development of improved building sites for new communities. The maximum mortgage insurable was \$10 million with a ten-year term, but later in 1966 it was increased to \$25 million - 75 percent of the value of the

developed land, or 50 percent of the land value before development, and 90 percent of estimated development cost.⁷

Under the Title X program, 25 projects of about 10,000 acres involving a \$50 million HUD guarantee were initiated up to 1972. This represented a discouraging report and was partly due to the 50 percent limit on the amount of "as is" land value which could be insured. It was also a consequence of developers borrowing through conventional bank channels at similar financing terms.⁸ As a result the government increased the amount of land value insurable to 80 percent of the "as is" or "before development" value.

The disappointing experience with the Title X program, and the increasing concern for structuring urban growth, led the Congress to formulate a program specifically directed towards encouraging new community construction. Title IV of the Housing and Urban Development Act 1968 was passed to complement title X, a section which had been maintained to encourage smaller scale land development projects. Under Title IV, the maximum obligation that could be insured in a single development was increased to \$50 million with repayment and maturity provisions negotiable, and supplementary grants were made available for a limited number of basic development programs. The aggregate maximum obligations outstanding was set at \$250 million. Despite the changes, the federal government was slow to implement the new program. Instructions for potential applicants desiring assistance were issued a year and half later, and final regulations were not published until April 1970. The first commitment was made in February 1970, to Jonathon Illinois.⁹

Other bodies helped to stimulate the acceptance of a new communities approach. During the late Sixties, the National Committee on Urban Growth Policy issued its report entitled The New City (1969). In its findings the Committee concluded that population growth would result in severe intensification of many urban problems: (1) continued growth of metropolitan areas through inco-ordinated sprawl of business, industry, and housing on their peripheries; (2) increasing difficulty of government at all levels to meet the demands of urban growth and the threat of urban decay; (3) further decline of central cities; (4) intensification of air, water, noise, and land pollution and further demands on already overcrowded transportation systems; and (5) a hardening of the pattern of limitations on housing and employment opportunities in peripheral areas for the poor and minority population.

The Committee concluded:

The federal government ...has recognized the national character of the problems that we face and has created programs in housing, education, job development and other areas. But the money to operate these programs has been inadequate for the task and, with few exceptions, the approaches have been fractionated among agencies and programs. We lack a consistent set of goals and comprehensive approach to the problems.¹⁰

In its recommendations the Committee recognized new communities as an essential part of an urban growth policy, and suggested that financial assistance be extended from the federal government to enable the creation of 100 new communities averaging 100,000 population each and 10 new communities of at least 1 million. It was expected that this program would accommodate 20 percent of the

anticipated population growth of the U.S. by the year 2000. By the standards of existing new community commitments these recommendations appear significant.

The promotion and assistance of new communities was to be predicated according to certain principles. The principles mirror to a great extent those goals of the British program with emphasis on a social and economic balance, low income opportunities and high standards of design. In addition the Committee recommended that the planning objectives be set by the government in accordance with national and regional policies, but that the private sector be encouraged to participate in the financing of projects as much as possible.

In partial response to these recommendations and to the shortcomings of previous policy responses, a bill was introduced entitled: "Urban Growth and New Community Development Bill". The bill, which was passed in 1970, became Title VII of the National Housing Act, and became the backbone of the federal new communities initiatives.

The major significance of Title VII was the increased role of the federal government in an area which had been dominated by private enterprise. It also provided an administrative framework, and spelled out the criteria in broad terms as to eligibility for grants and loans under the New Communities program.

Under Title VII, major changes were made in the amount, type, and eligibility requirements of loans and grants. Following¹¹ is a list of the most significant changes.

1. The aggregate loan obligations were raised to \$500 million from \$250 million (Title IV), however the maximum obligation that could be guaranteed with respect to a single project was limited to \$50 million. Private developers were to be guaranteed an amount covering up to 80 percent of the value of the real property before development and 90 percent of the land development cost. Public developers, which included cities, counties, etc., would receive a guarantee covering 100 percent for both the value of real property and land development costs.

The federal guarantee allowed the developer to offer debt instruments similar to corporate bonds, a method of financing considered superior to more conventional methods which required him to profit share with the lender.

2. To ease front-loading of costs, the law allowed for principal and interest charge deferments for up to 15 years for both private and public developers. In addition special 3-year public service grants were available to public authorities to fund basic education, health, and public safety services considered essential in the early stages of new community construction.

3. Assistance for planning (up to 60%) was available for both private and public groups for use particularly associated with programs designed to meet social or environmental problems, or support new technological innovations. Another provision under Title VII (Sec. 735) also allowed for 75% grants to formulate plans and programs relating to the development of criteria, standards, and implementation procedures for the structuring of urban growth.
4. Supplementary grants were also provided to state and local public bodies for a number of programs: urban mass transportation, highways, airports, public health facilities, libraries, recreation, open space, neighbourhood facilities, etc.
5. Renewal legislation was amended by certain provisions of Title VII (Sec. 740) which were legislated to encourage redevelopment of inner city areas by the creation of new-towns-in-town. Redevelopment agencies would be permitted to acquire and assemble large tracts of non-blighted land, inappropriately used land, and marginal land for the purposes of eventual disposal at a write-down for the development of a new town.

6. Finally section 723 authorized the federal government with the approval of the President and Congress, to undertake various demonstration projects to improve federal competence in the field of new community building and generate information for monitoring state and local activities.

To be eligible for this federal assistance,
a proposed community must be one of four types:¹²

- (1) a satellite or suburban community that is economically balanced, located within or directly adjacent to metropolitan areas, and which will serve as an alternative to urban sprawl;
- (2) new-towns-in-town (NTIT) that are adjacent to or within existing cities, planned for vacant or land requiring redevelopment, and that will serve to revitalize existing cores, stabilize surrounding neighbourhoods, and provide a full range of housing within easy access of centre city populations;
- (3) small town growth centres that are smaller communities in rural areas which could be expanded into larger urban centres, and which could help to prevent economic decline and stem migration to major metropolitan areas;
- (4) free-standing self-sufficient new communities that are located at further distances from existing urban areas.

In addition to the four specific types outlined above, paired new communities are also eligible for federal subsidies. These are satellite and in-town communities which are linked together either by a common developer, by common services, or by transit or other transportation facilities to bridge the gap between the centre city and suburb, and which will offer residents of both locations greater choice in jobs, education, and cultural facilities.

The Title VII legislation is flexible and does not attempt to provide a specific definition of what a new community should be. In order to qualify for governmental assistance however, there are a number of conditions which must be met. These are in the form of eligibility prerequisites.¹³

1. The new community must have a variety of basic facilities normally associated with a town or city including a substantial job base.
2. The projected plan must be designed to maintain an attractive environment and combine activities into an "harmonious whole".
3. There must be a substantial amount of housing and work for people of varying classes of racial compositions.
4. The proposed centre must provide a good alternative to disorderly urban growth, preserve and enhance the natural environment, and be consistent with areawide planning.

5. The plan must comply with the National Environmental Policy Act, and must receive approval from all state and local agencies.
6. The developer must indicate that he has the financial, technical, and administrative ability to carry the project through to successful completion.

The American new community can be built from "scratch" or added to an existing centre as long as it is "demonstrably different than that which existed before".¹⁴ The law does not define a maximum or minimum size although it is expected that the new communities will range from 20,000 to 150,000.¹⁵

To date seventeen new communities have been approved for a guarantee assistance of \$361 million, and nine have actually issued debentures guaranteed by the federal government amounting to \$197.2 million.¹⁶ There are over thirty-nine projects in the application stage, the majority of which are for satellite communities.¹⁷ However, there are an increasing number of new-town-in-town proposals but these are still in the preparatory stage.

The federal guarantee enables the developer to borrow substantial amounts to off-set front-end expenses and to repay on a schedule which fits the cash flow of the project. Payments normally commence in the 11th year with final maturity in the 20th year. The interest rate is low, generally between 7 and 8 per cent.¹⁸

TABLE III-1
UNITED STATES

Community	Type	Guarantee Commit- ment	Guarantee Issues		Population (projected)	Dwelling Units (projected)	Location
		Amount Date	Amount Date	Interest Rate			
Jonathan, Minnesota	Satellite/ Growth Center	\$21,000 2/70	\$ 8,000 10/70 ²	8.50%	50,000 in 20 years	16,500 in 20 years	20 mi. S.W. of Minneapolis
			\$13,000 6/72	7.20%			
St. Charles Communities, Maryland	Satellite	\$24,000 6/70	\$18,000 12/70	7.75%	75,000 in 20 years	25,000 in 20 years	25 mi. S.W. of Wash., D.C.
Park Forest South, Illinois	Satellite	\$30,000 6/70	\$30,000 3/71	7.00%	110,000 in 15 years	35,000 in 15 years	30 mi. S. of Chicago
Flower Mound, Texas	Satellite	\$18,000 12/70	\$14,000 10/71	7.60%	64,000 in 20 years	18,000 in 20 years	20 mi. S.W. of Dallas
Maumelle, Arkansas	Satellite	\$ 7,500 12/70	\$ 4,500 6/72	7.62%	45,000 in 20 years	14,000 in 20 years	12 mi. N.W. of Little Rock
Cedar- Riverside, Minnesota	New-Town- In-Town	\$24,000 6/71	\$24,000 12/71	7.20%	30,000 in 20 years	12,500 in 20 years	downtown Minneapolis
Riverton, New York	Satellite	\$12,000	\$12,000 5/72	7.125%	25,600 in 16 years	8,000 in 16 years	10 mi. S. of Rochester
San Antonio Ranch, Texas ³	Satellite	\$18,000 2/72	— —	—	88,000 in 30 years	28,000 in 30 years	20 mi. N.W. of San Antonio
The Wood lands, Texas	Satellite	\$50,000 4/72	\$50,000 9/72	7.10%	150,000 in 20 years	49,160 in 20 years	30 mi. N.W. of Houston
Gananda, New York	Satellite	\$22,000 4/72	\$22,000 12/72	7.15%	50,000 in 20 years	17,200 in 20 years	12 mi. E. of Rochester
Soul City, North Carolina	Free Standing	\$14,000 6/72	— —	—	44,000 in 30 years	12,906 in 30 years	45 mi. N. of Raleigh- Durham
Harbison, South Carolina	Satellite	\$13,000 10/72	— —	—	23,000 in 20 years	6,750 in 20 years	8 mi. N.W. of Columbia
Lysander, New York	Satellite	⁴	⁵	⁵	18,300 in 8 years	5,000 in 8 years	12 mi. N.W. of Syracuse
Welfare Island, New York	New-Town- In-Town	⁴ 12/72	— —	—	18,000 in 7 years	5,000 in 7 years	in New York City
Shenandoah, Georgia	Satellite/ Growth Center	\$40,000 2/73	— —	—	70,000 in 20 years	23,000 in 20 years	35 mi. S.W. of Atlanta

¹ Source: Department of Housing and Urban Development, as of February 1973.

² Guaranteed under Title IV; all other guarantees under Title VII.

³ Contingent on water protection studies.


⁴ Eligible for 20% grant from HUD supplementing basic federal grant programs.

⁵ First to receive a determination of eligibility for grant assistance rather than federal guarantee of its debt; receives federal assistance under Title VII, Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970.

Source: H. Miels, Jr., Federally Assisted New Communities,
Urban Land Institute, 1973, Table 3, p.27

Figure III-1
UNITED STATES

Location of New Communities



●
New Communities
Approved by HUD

- A Jonathan
- B St. Charles
- C Park Forest South
- D Flower Mound
- E Maumelle
- F Cedar-Riverside
- G Riverton
- H San Antonio Ranch
- I Woodlands
- J Gananda
- K Soul City
- L Lysander
- M Harbison
- N Welfare Island
- O Shenandoah

○
New Communities Completing
the HUD Application Process

- A Beckett
- B Brookwood
- C New Franconia
- D Oak Openings
- E Ponchartrain
- F Amherst/Ransom Oaks
- G Rancho San Diego
- H Stansbury Park
- I Fort Lincoln
- J Midland
- K Nouville
- L Kansas City West
- M San Antonio NTIT
- N Kane County
- O Pattonsburg
- P Shelby Farms
- Q Tree Farm
- R Timberlake
- S Deer Run
- T Murrock

Source: H. Miels, Jr., Federally Assisted New Communities,
1973, p.80

The federal government acts merely as a financial support agent with new communities being built solely by private or local government initiative. There is a fee associated with the application process amounting to \$10,000. This non-refundable fee helps to defray the costs incurred by HUD. Review and processing of the application takes from 6 to 12 months, in addition to the time it takes to prepare the application and ensure all prerequisite studies are completed.

Among the public developers are U.D.C., a New York State corporation, a county or city. Where a combination of private and public developers actively participate in a project the private developer is usually responsible for housing, commercial and industrial development, and the public authority takes over responsibility for parks, recreation, and community facilities.

The states have now begun to actively legislate for new communities as well. New York initiated its program in 1969 with the creation of the New York State Urban Development Corporation (UDC), and to date has 3 communities underway (Audubon, Lysander, and Welfare Island).¹⁹ In 1970 the UDC published a report in which was projected an increase in the state population of 5 million by the year 2000. It was proposed that half this increase should be housed in new communities, at a public cost of \$1.8 billion. The reasoning behind this large new communities commitment was the need for expansion of the housing supply to meet current and projected demand, coupled with an inability on the part of private developers to secure large tracts of developable land easily.

3.3 Goals of the New Communities Program

From the review provided in the previous section, it is obvious that the American program of new town building consists really of two types of projects: those which are wholly controlled and financed by private enterprise, and those which rely on financial assistance from the federal government. While the concern of this paper is generally with the latter type, a brief discussion of two selected communities, Reston and Columbia, initiated before the implementation of the federal program will help to illustrate the goals of the wholly privately-initiated new community projects.

Reston was begun in 1962 with seven goals in mind:

- (1) the widest choice of opportunities for full use of leisure time;
- (2) an environment flexible enough for people to remain in a single neighbourhood throughout their lives;
- (3) a priority in planning for the importance and dignity of the individual;
- (4) the chance for people to live and work in the same community;
- (5) the availability to residents of commercial, cultural and recreation facilities from the outset of development;
- (6) preservation and encouragement of beauty; and
- (7) financial success.²⁰

Many of these goals parallel those of the British new towns. Goal 5 however provides an interesting variation, in that all facilities should be available from the outset, a goal which would place extremely heavy front-loading on the financial plan for development. What is missing from these goals is the intent to provide housing for all income classes and racial groups, in order to create a socially balanced community. This is not surprising since the private developers were concerned with a financial return on investment which would no doubt be reduced if low income housing had been part of the scheme.

Reston, like most of the other privately developed new communities of the period, now has mostly middle income residents who are young to middle-age and white. Therefore it is not a socially balanced community.

Columbia's developers stressed a different goal - that of a socially and economically integrated community. To achieve this they stressed a multi-disciplinary approach to planning with experts from all fields participating in the community's development. Columbia does appear to have succeeded in this goal for 17 per cent of the residents are classified as low income, and a substantial number of jobs have been created through the attraction of a varied economic sector.

With the introduction of the federal new communities program, a broader interpretation of new communities goals has arisen. The goals are differentiated as to five major types: spatial, socio-economic, environmental, design, and institutional/political. They are presented in Figure III-2.

The American program is still in infancy, and hence it is difficult if not impossible to determine whether or not the goals will be met. Because of the scheme adopted by HUD; it appears that most of the goals will be actually defined within the context of eligibility criteria and hence for all intents and purposes, many of the criteria will be satisfied in the plan formulation stage. Thus in discussing the success or failure of the new community program vis-à-vis stated goals, one must turn partly to a description of the safeguards which have been established to ensure that the goals will be met. These safeguards are the prerequisites which must be satisfied for federal assistance.

Figure III-2

United States
Goals of New Community Initiatives

Spatial
Goals

1. control of suburban growth
2. reversal of migration from existing cities or rural areas to major metropolitan areas

Socio-Economic
Goals

1. financial return to new communities investment
2. creation of "whole" communities, socially and economically balanced, with housing for all income groups constructed throughout the building process
3. elimination of substandard conditions in central core areas
4. creation of communities which will have a long term favourable fiscal impact upon the area in which the new community is located*

Environmental
Goals

1. conservation of natural resources and preservation of unique features

Design Goals

1. creation of a physically attractive living environment
2. innovation
3. accessibility to transportation facilities

Institutional
Political
Goals

1. consistency of planning on national, state, local, and private levels
2. creation of new communities as self-governing municipalities*
3. strengthen the capacity of state and local governments to deal with local problems.*

* lack of information available at present time to assess achievement of goal

3.3.1 Spatial Goals

control of suburban growth

According to the 1970 census, 65 per cent of the population lived in metropolitan areas and of this, 36 per cent lived in suburbs.²¹ It was felt that new communities could achieve greater economies in services and resources and would be able to provide superior living environments over the typical low density suburban zone.

There is little indication to what extent this goal has been realized. In some of the earlier new town schemes, the goal of financial return led many developers to locate their new communities immediately adjacent major conurbations so as to ensure employment opportunities for new residents. Without strictly enforced state planning controls, the new town merely became a dormitory satellite, with little distinction as to where previous suburbs ended and the new town began.

reversal of migration from existing cities or rural areas to major metropolitan areas

One of the principle spatial goals to which the new towns program has been addressed is the redress of the rural-urban imbalance through the reversal of migration patterns. The main problem is seen as redirecting migration away from the metropolitan areas and encouraging it in free standing centres at some distance from the major conurbations. Soul City has been developed particularly with this goal in mind.

Soul City in North Carolina was intended to stem northward migration of the blacks, whites and Indians living in the southern states. The program for the development of Soul City included the creation of an industrial base and the provision of facilities to attract residents. In the first two years 400 jobs were created. Facilities were to be financed through the issuance of a bond. It was expected that Soul City would reach an eventual population mix of 50 per cent black, 50 per cent white.²²

To date there is no indication to what degree migration will be altered with the implementation of the new communities program. In the case of Soul City it is difficult to say whether the new residents that have already located there were actually destined for the larger metropoli, or whether Soul City will contribute in spite of itself, to promote further rural depopulation in the immediate local area. What may be an important factor is the proximity of the new communities such as Soul City to major transportation routes - a factor which may help to accelerate the growth of a strong economic base. It is not at all evident however that the creation of new communities will stem migration since the communities are insufficient both in size and number. Furthermore the location of these communities is subject to developer initiative, with the government playing no major role in designating sites that would be more optimum from the standpoint of attaining this goal.

3.3.2 Socio-economic goals

financial return to new communities investment

It goes without saying that private developers must achieve a certain minimum return on investment in order to remain in the business of building new communities. But the large amounts of capital required mean that there will be a relatively limited number of developers unless the returns are sufficient to meet the opportunity cost of using capital in that capacity.

Historically the new town developers procured funds from major corporations. But companies interested in the development of new communities have been limited since large sums were tied up for long periods of time. To some extent the financial picture was improved with the introduction of the federal loan guarantee program. Because of it the developer could offer debt instruments similar to corporate bonds on the open market, and secure lower interest rates. Furthermore a higher loan-to-value ratio meant that the developer would have to secure less equity.

There is little evidence to lead to a conclusion that the federal program has improved the investment picture for the developer. Prior to its introduction the developer maximized his return by gearing his community to high income residents. But capital then had to be raised on the open market, often with an arrangement that led the financial backer to share

half of the profits. With the federal program loans were secured, interest rates were lower, but the trade-off was to build more units of a lower revenue producing nature. It can only be said because of the relatively greater number of developers seeking federal assistance, that the actual return on investment must be sufficient to attract new builders into the program.

creation of whole communities, socially and economically balanced

One of the key goals of the new community initiatives is to create "whole" communities, which are socially and economically balanced. Social balance is conceived in terms of having a certain mix of economic classes, a mix of housing types to accommodate various classes, and a cross-section of ethnic groups. Economic balance relates to a number of sub-objectives as well: allowing people to live and work in the same community; creation of a diversified job base with jobs representing a range of skills and income levels. Each of these sub-objectives will be discussed in turn.

"social balance"

The sub-goal of social balance is the actual "raison d'être" of the federal assistance program. The developers, under the terms of the present Title VII program, have been made contractually obligated to develop land, build lower income units, and use their efforts to sell them in conjunction with their housing mix plan. HUD monitors the developer's performance and may find him in default if he does not live up to the terms of the contract.

At present there are 280,000 projected housing units in the 15 approved new communities; 28 per cent of these are intended for persons of low and moderate income. Housing mix for 6 selected communities is presented in Table III-2. It appears therefore that American new communities may achieve income balance to some extent, but two major qualifications are evident. First, although some provision is made for those on the lower end of the income scale, there is no indication if the income margin is low enough to attract the majority of low income people. Secondly, it must be remembered that income mix is only required by those seeking federal assistance.

It is also a sub-goal of the American new community program to encourage racial integration. In Park Forest South, Black occupancy ranges from 6 per cent in the condominiums to 28 per cent in the single family dwellings. Likewise in Cedar-Riverside, 13 per cent of the renters are minority group families.

The criteria used by HUD to determine what the population profile and housing mix should be are derived from examining income and racial profiles from the area. But these planning criteria do not indicate the actual integration achieved. This can only be measured by such indicators as participation, interaction patterns, etc., and to date there has been no comment about such matters.

TABLE III-2

UNITED STATES
HOUSING MIX IN 6 SELECTED NEW
COMMUNITIES
(% of low and moderate income housing units)

New Community	Income Range	% of Total Housing
Cedar Riverside	<\$8,200	14
	\$8,200-9,900	43
	total:	57
Jonathon	<\$7,800	25
	\$7,800-10,500	25
	total:	50
Maumelle	<\$5,000	7
	\$5,000-7,000	16
	\$7,000-10,000	23
	total:	46
Riverton	<\$5,000	27
	\$5,000-10,000	18
	total:	45
San Antonio Ranch	<\$7,500	29
	\$7,000-10,500	47
	total:	77
St. Charles Communities	<\$7,500	21
	\$7,500-10,000	63
	total:	84

Source: H. Mielsds, Jr., Federally Assisted New Communities,
(Washington, 1973), p.94

Despite the absence of more comprehensive indicators it appears as though the goal of social balance will be difficult to achieve in new communities at the outset. Early sales or rentals to low income groups and minorities may jeopardize sales to higher income groups. Late settlement may result in flight of higher income groups. Heavy sales of lower priced accommodation may hinder the fiscal development to support needed community facilities. It is therefore difficult to see how lower income and minority groups can be included in the plans for new communities on more than a token basis without greater assistance from the federal government and a change in societal attitudes.

"economic balance"

Another goal of the American program is to create a broad enough economic base so that people can live and work in the same community. In the 15 new communities planned, some 227,000 jobs are to be provided. Given the total projected population, this represents a job ratio of 85 jobs to 100 residents. The Americans admit that some in and out-commuting will occur, and are realistic of the need to provide adequate transportation facilities to encourage industrial expansion. From Table III-3, it appears that a diversity of employment opportunities and broad economic base will be provided in most of the new communities, elements which are missing from earlier privately financed new communities (dormitories and retirement villages). The majority of the jobs will be in the industrial sector.

TABLE III-3
UNITED STATES

New Community	Total	Industrial	Multi-use ¹	Educa- tional	Medical	Other
Cedar-Riverside	4,609	NA				1,336 ²
Flower Mound	11,723	8,450	3,273			
Jonathan	23,189	18,893	2,796	1,500		
Maumelle	15,000	12,000				3,000
Park Forest South	28,633	10,188	11,400	3,745	3,100	200
Riverton	11,180	8,530	1,430	300		920
San Antonio Ranch	17,990	4,170		430		
St. Charles Communities	14,890	9,840	950	3,050	1,050	

¹ Includes commercial, office, governmental, service and residential land uses with associated parking facilities.

² Includes hotel, health, automotive, cultural and entertainment, day care, educational occupations.

Source: H. Miels, Jr., Federally Assisted New Communities
1973, Table 12

elimination of substandard conditions in central core areas

New-Towns-In-Town have been adopted under Title VII as a means by which central core areas may be rejuvenated. This type of development presupposes a stress on aspects of the plan which would cater to lower income groups, i.e., through employment opportunities and subsidized housing. Benefits are expected to be derived from rentals, and increased rental values are expected to be created in the areas surrounding the site. There is no indication as of yet whether this goal may be achieved or whether the New-Towns-in-Town approach will be sufficient in itself to encourage core redevelopment. What is apparent however is the process of abandonment in the central city areas which may help to encourage redevelopment on a large scale. Some of the projects under the present HUD system, such as Cedar Riverside (30,000 people on 100 acres), and Welfare Island, appear more like conventional development projects which may suffer the fate of earlier renewal schemes.

3.3.3 Environmental Goals

conservation of natural resources and preservation of unique features

One of the main objectives of the American program is the conservation of natural resources and preservation of unique features in designing and implementing a new community plan. The achievement of this goal appears certain because of

the requirements specified as part of the HUD application process. During the application stage, HUD prepares a detailed environmental impact statement in accord with the Environmental Policy Act of 1969. At the same time a developer is required to submit an environmental analysis of the proposed site. This analysis includes: a summary of the project data, a description of the reviews undertaken by all agencies concerned with the environment, a detailed account of the environment and the impact of the proposed new community on the environment as compared with impacts of alternative forms of development. In particular the analysis must include comments about the type, density, location of various species of flora and fauna with reference to rare or endangered species. It must also indicate hazards, potential pollution, economic resources, aesthetic and human interest factors, and proposed waste disposal facilities. Once the report is submitted, it is circulated to various departments of the central administration for assessment and comments.

With the stringent requirement for environmental assessment, it is obvious that environmental problems should be minimized. Since the land is under single ownership, density trade-offs allow the developer to maintain large open areas including flood plains, woodlands, and vistas, while still creating a marketable product.

There are 20,000 acres of permanent open space designated in 17 new communities. This constitutes 23 per cent of the total acreage,²³ a ratio well above that of conventional suburban development projects.

3.3.4 Design Goals

creation of a physically attractive living environment

It goes without saying that private developers will create a physically aesthetic living environment if it is economical from a marketing standpoint. Unlike the British program which decentralized people "forceably" through the employment and housing schemes, the American developer must rely on people's preferences and his selling ability to attract residents to his site.

To ensure a high quality of urban design Titles IV and VII developers have agreed to establish design review boards which have the power to review and approve or reject site plans and architectural designs of all proposed building exteriors. Riverton and Jonathan have already established an architectural review board; Park Forest South has a design and beautification committee.

It appears therefore because of the dictates of the market place and the institutional design review system, that new communities will achieve a physically attractive living environment.

innovation

The American new community developers are encouraged through the eligibility requirements for HUD assistance (Title VII) to adopt innovative techniques and ideas. To date the developers

have experimented in new health and educational delivery systems and have agreed to investigate the use of industrialized or modular housing. In Flower Mound, developers are studying the feasibility of establishing a pollution-free internal mass transit system. At Cedar-Riverside study is being done of the possibilities of vertical multi-use land development. One of the more interesting innovations that has been approved is the "pairing" of Jonathan and Cedar-Riverside in creating exchange programs in the form of technical information sharing and the development of joint social services.

accessibility to transportation facilities

All of the approved new communities have good accessibility to the major urban centres via planned or existing highways. In addition, the site plans for each incorporate schemes for a rapid transit system, both within the project or linking the project to surrounding urban centres.

3.3.5 Institutional/Political Goals

consistency of planning on national, state, local, and private levels

At present private developers operate within a framework set by federal, state, and local governments. While the developer is responsible for the full implementation of his project, he must comply with federal regulations to secure loan guarantees, and operate under the constraints of restrictive enabling legislation.

There is to date no co-ordinated national/state/local government policy concerning the location and support of new community programs. Because new community development requires the acquisition of and control over very large parcels of land, the private developer necessarily comes in contact with numerous governmental agencies, each exercising planning powers over a small area. The limited scope of decision making at the local level impedes the formulation of strong regional policies. Overlapping layers of local government restrict the degree to

which policy consensus is possible. Local policy-making is incremental in nature, lacks depth, direction, and commitment.

Under the present system operated by HUD, local and state approvals must be obtained before federal guarantees are forthcoming. The process of approval is slow, and unco-ordinated, with developers waiting almost two years before plans are approved. While the goal for consistency of planning on national, state, and local levels may be achieved through the consultative process, it may be at the expense of society.

3.4 Summary

New communities in the United States are developed by both public and private developers, the latter however constituting the greatest proportion. In order to secure loan guarantees developers may apply to the federal government under Titles X and VII of the National Housing Act. The federal government does not actively participate in the community building process, but has established standards which developers must meet in order to be eligible for federal assistance. The federal government's only control is its discretionary power to limit loan guarantees. Local and state governments may however control location and land use through zoning. But the lack of institutional co-ordination has hindered the new communities process as well as limited the degree to which these tools could be utilized to redirect growth, stem out-migration, and revitalize blighted areas. Other constraints

to the process have included: difficulty in securing large tracts of land, limited loan guarantees, delay in securing application approval, inadequate local planning machinery.

Unlike the British program however, the American new community planners have emphasized individual freedom through the use of the market mechanism. The design of new communities is left to the developer and he markets what he feels the people will buy, and what will maximize his return for least given cost. Hence from a scarce resource standpoint the American program may be more economically rational than its British counterpart.

Footnotes

- 1 A.I.P. Background Paper No. 2, "New Communities: Challenge for Today", October 1968, p.1
- 2 *ibid.*
- 3 "New Communities: Challenge for Today", *Supra* note 1, at p.6-7
- 4 H. Mielsds, Federally Assisted New Communities: New Dimensions in Urban Development, Urban Land Institute, (Washington 1973), p.11
- 5 *ibid.*, p.30
- 6 A. Turner, New Communities in the United States: 1968-1973, Town Planning Review, Vol. 45, No. 4, July 1974, p.261
- 7 *ibid.*, p.261
- 8 H. Mielsds, *Supra* note 1, at p.24
- 9 *ibid.*
- 10 *ibid.*
- 11 National Committee on Urban Growth Policy, The New City, 1969, p.170
- 12 H. Mielsds, *Supra* note 1, at p.32-33
- 13 *ibid.*, p.37
- 14 E.M. Lamont, "New Communities: the Federal Program", Real Property Probate and Trust Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1974, p.37
- 15 H. Mielsds, *Supra* note 1, at p.38
- 16 Lamont, *Supra* note 14, at p.37
- 17 *ibid.*
- 18 H. Mielsds, *Supra* note 1, at p.30
- 19 Lamont, *Supra* note 14, at p.37
- 20 H. Mielsds, *Supra* note 1, at p.16
- 21 Lamont, *Supra* note 14, at p.36

- 22 R.W. Scott, "New Towns as 'Self-Sufficient' Growth Centres-
Dream or Feasible Reality?", Urban and Social Change Review,
Vol. 5: 1, Fall 1971, p.17-18
- 23 Lamont, Supra note 14, at p.38

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Appendix I

National Committee on Urban Growth Policy

New Community Recommendations

1. New Communities developed under this program must significantly contribute to an increase in housing, education, training, and employment in the area in which it is built, with particular attention to the needs of central cities;
2. New Communities under this program should result in socially and economically adjusted communities. Special account should be taken of the needs of low and moderate income families. Special opportunities should be provided to afford gainful, varied, and satisfying employment to such families. They should not, however, be induced to migrate to new towns without the assurance of having there employment, adequate housing, recreation, and like facilities.
New towns should be attractive to all classes, creeds, and races; to all types of businesses and industries; to a mix of citizen talent that will insure new town success.
3. New communities developed under this program should be carried out in accordance with the announced planning objectives of the state and local governments of the region in which the development is located. They must be consistent with existing and future national objectives and policy for orderly urban growth and development.
4. New community developments under this program must provide full opportunity for the private sector to be engaged in both long-term financing and construction within the larger planning objectives established by the governments involved.
5. New community developments assisted under this program should not encourage the proliferation of special service districts, and should, to the maximum extent possible, build upon the powers of general purpose state, county, and local governments.
6. New communities developed under this program should encourage the use of the latest technological advances in construction.
7. New communities developed under this program should follow the highest standards of planning and urban design.

Source: National Committee on Urban Growth Policy, The New City, 1969, p.172-173

IV France

4.1 Problem Statement

Most difficulties of urban growth are associated with surging population increases, rapid industrialization, and an immature system of cities.¹ Curiously enough France's problems of urban concentration and regional economic lag began to accumulate even in the near absence of these characteristic conditions. This is what differentiates France from the other countries of this study.

During the mid-nineteenth century France experienced a much less rapid population growth than many other western European nations. While the population of Britain, Italy and Germany doubled from the 1850's to 1950's, France's population increased by only 14 percent.² This was attributed to its declining birth rate; a phenomenon which did not occur until much later in the other three nations. After World War II (from 1946-1968), there was a significant increase in the growth rate to 23.5 percent. This later growth manifested itself in the towns and villages in response to industrialization demands which were gradually appearing evident. By the late Forties, 50 percent of the French population was living in urban areas. This figure had increased to 70 percent by the early Seventies.

Most of this growth was centred in the Paris Region, with 120,000 people being added yearly to the city's population.³ Two-fifths of the growth was attributed to net in-migration. This was almost inevitable however, for the Paris region was favoured in most respects. It was the focal point of a highly centralized political and administrative system and the centre of the nation's most important commercial, industrial, cultural, and social facilities. Furthermore a progressive civic design policy, and a Paris-centred transportation system enhanced the city's attractiveness and encouraged further infrastructure investments.⁴

However Paris grew at the expense of the surrounding provinces. Inter-regional disparities did not exist so much as Paris-province imbalances. Most of the economic activities in the provinces lagged, causing unemployment. Agriculture as an industry was disadvantaged because of the absence of metropolitan markets. With disparity in wage rates and employment opportunities, it was not surprising that increased migration occurred, compounding the problem further.

This growth of Paris placed strain on housing, office space, servicing provision, and industrial land; and with the war effort and war-ravaged urban centres, the problem of providing basic facilities was formidable. The increased prices of land after the war strongly discouraged individual

building. Urban growth was mainly in the form of expanding suburbs, which gave little relief to the core areas. Uncontrollable traffic, destruction of historic areas, reduction of green open space, pollution, and congestion were characteristic of a growing Paris.

...Faced with a strangling, choking Paris and often anemic provinces, it was in the national interest to initiate a concerted effort to alter the historical power structure achieved over fourteen centuries of royal, imperial, and republican rule.⁵

The French response then arose out of a desire to balance economic growth inter-regionally and reduce the pressures on Paris. A major limitation on this goal however continued to operate - the national objective of promoting the economy's maximum growth and the enhancement of its competitive position internationally and within the Common Market.⁶

Satisfying this economic growth objective implied reinforcing the more prosperous regions and neglecting the lagging ones. The planners in realizing this, were charged with providing a solution which would effectively help the poorer regions without arresting the progress of the more prosperous. This presupposed the creation of administrative mechanisms that could carry out the necessary development measures. Rodwin stated:

...Attempts to solve these problems exposed the inadequacies of sectoral analysis of national development problems and ultimately

compelled the French planners to regard urban and regional planning as an indispensable territorial expression of national economic planning.⁷

4.2 The Policy Response

The issue of urban/rural disparity became public with the timely release of a study in 1947 by J.F. Gavier entitled Paris et le Désert Français.⁸ Three years later the Minister of Reconstruction and Urbanism enunciated a significant policy for decentralization involving industry and academic institutions. This marked the beginning of a change in thought about national and regional development. The focus on national economic growth was subtly transformed to concern for regional economic balance, and this change was manifested in the central government support of regional development plans initiated by local organizations, and the subsequent "meshing" of these programs with those of the central ministry responsible for land use and physical development.

The instruments which the French government had under its control to effect a decentralization policy and promote regional growth were meagre in comparison to Britain'. They included some limited expropriation powers, and controls over industrial and office construction and extension.⁹ From 1960 on, permitted expansions for industrial, commercial, and office activities were subjected to a levy system to pay for the infrastructure development required.

Accepting the assumption that it was desirable to limit the growth of Paris, and promote it elsewhere, the Ministry of Construction began a new land use plan for the Paris region. PADOG, as the plan became known, proposed the reduction of migration to Paris to 50,000 a year. This was intended to limit the growth of Paris to 100,000 a year. Over-spill was to be directed at the perimeter of the region, to stimulate a number of major market and regional centres.

The Plan also had three other related strategies: the decongestion of the urban centre through improvements in planning; the prevention of additional congestion by attempting to prevent central office locations and by providing new growth nodes in the suburbs; and the implementation of a massive urban renewal program in Paris' core area.

By the mid-Sixties it was realized that PADOG objectives would not be realized. Continued immigration caused massive suburban sprawl which compounded commuting problems and placed even greater weight on the provision of adequate infrastructure.

The growth rate of Paris was not reduced. Between 1954 and 1962 Paris grew at the same or slightly higher rate than the rest of France. This in part was a result of large loopholes in the controls implemented by the Commission Interministérielle de Décentralization (CID). Small and average-sized enterprises were exempt under the system and

it appeared from the massive authorization of floor space for office or industrial purposes that CID did not actively promote decentralization at all.¹⁰ Furthermore, regional development plans which were intended to guide decentralization initiatives, lacked full analysis of the economic and social variables of development, and presented no guidelines for implementation.

4.2.1 Evolution of New Town Policy

New town policy per se did not evolve in France until well into the 1960's. While many studied the program that had been developing in Britain since 1944, particularly the London ring town model, the French rejected the British strategy on the basis that new towns of the scale envisaged would be no more than "grands ensembles".¹¹ Rather the French new town movement evolved as a part of the regional strategies for development. The first appearance of new towns was in the 1965 Paris plan executed by IAURP.¹²

In response to the failure of PADOG, IAURP was created with the function of making further studies of the Paris Region. In 1965 it forwarded a policy plan for Paris designed not to prohibit growth, but to reorganize it along two axes parallel to the Seine Valley. The principle components of the plan catered to long-range planning and were based on the following predictions: that purchasing power would be doubled by 1985 and trebled by the year 2000; that office jobs

would increase twice as fast as industrial jobs; that the need for leisure activities would quadruple by 2000; and that the demand for urban transport per person would increase by 30 percent.¹³

The plan envisioned a future population of Paris to be 14 million by the year 2000, an increase of 5 million inhabitants.

Under the Plan, growth was to be extended in two zones, north and south of the Seine.¹⁴ The area in between was to be allocated to recreational purposes, free from urban development. The zones were selected on the basis of environmental preservation and integration vis-à-vis existing settlement patterns. Envisaged in the plan was the development of eight urban nodes (new towns) based upon the availability of sites and transport facilities, and selected on the basis of their ability to help in the transformation of the existing suburbs.

At the same time as IAURP was operating to effect managed urban growth in the Paris region, both OREAM and OREAV were created to provide comparably efficient services to those in the French provinces.¹⁵ These two services operated on different scales. The OREAM, "organizations for the study of metropolitan areas", dealt at the problem level of "counter-balancing capitals" in the context of organizing the growth of a single town. The OREAV dealt with the main valleys of the Paris Region and hence was thought to be

instrumental to the success of structuring the decentralization of Paris.

Some of these bodies proposed creating new towns, and as early as 1967, the Lower Seine Valley Agency proposed the site for Vaudreuil. Later other projects were proposed: l'Isle d'Abeau (Lyon), Etang de Berre (Marseille), and Villeneuve d'Ascq (Lille).¹⁶

Debate arose over the siting of Le Vaudreuil since the Normandy agency had proposed it in place of Nantes-Sud, a Paris project town. This debate induced the government to adjust the new towns policy to perfect a better balance between Paris and the provinces. The number of Paris new towns was reduced to five, and provincial towns were to be four.

The type of new town envisaged by these bodies differed considerably from the early British proto-type. Unlike the British, the French chose to ignore self-containment as a goal and opted to promote much larger centres. It was felt that higher population targets would be needed to absorb the expected growth, create an attractive environment, and support functions of a "truly urban character". The Paris new towns were planned to accommodate from 100,000 to 600,000 residents, and the service shed of the new centre was in terms of one million people.

Some of the new towns were designed to absorb a proportion of the metropolitan growth by being sited

along the development corridors - St. Quentin-en-Yvelines, Evry, and Marne-la-Vallée.¹⁷ They were planned at a distance of 15 to 35 kilometres from the centre of Paris and were to be linked by motor-way and the new express Métro. The issue of location vis-à-vis the metropolitan area however was hotly debated. The objections raised were based on the contention that new towns merely would add to existing suburban sprawl if located so close to the centre. But the Paris Regional District opted for sites "close-in" since it was felt that additional infrastructure expenditures particularly for transportation, of a more remote location, would not be offset by lower land costs. However, certain other new towns such as Cergy-Pontoise and Le Vaudreuil were to remain physically distinct from the mother centre, and were based on a discontinuous urbanization scheme.

V. Ahtik provides an idea of what these new French towns were intended to be.

...the French new towns (aim) at being neither a satellite nor autonomous, but a secondary town; neither completely differentiated nor specialized but with a preferential function; neither concentrated nor scattered, but a pole integrated in the whole of the metropolitan area...(They) must be centred on flexible operational objectives, adapted to the special local context and capable of developing along various lines.¹⁸

At present the French new town program is intended to be part of the formulation of a very long term overall regional strategy, combining the use of the legal and financial resources of the national authorities with the creation of

new decentralized structures. The actual new town planning and development process is defined by a number of authors to be the following. First of all, it is stressed as an integral part of the implementation process for a regional plan. It is not considered to be a separate policy commitment nor intended to be so. If proposals for new towns advanced in the regional strategies are accepted, a study group is formed and financed by the national government. The New Town Public Authority (Etablissement Public) then is established only after all studies are completed. The French development corporation is invested with most of the powers of the British prototype, however it does not become directly involved with the actual building operation. J.P. Lacaze has stated:

...the agencies responsible for the new towns act as developers and co-ordinators, but not as builders. They buy sites, equip them and resell them, they draw up programs in agreement with the owners, but unlike the British New Town Corporations, they are not themselves competent to build houses... The French solution obliges those responsible for the new towns to dialogue with promoters and builders...this compels those responsible to pay greater attention to the reactions of prospective users as reflected by those of the promoters. Since they cannot impose revolutionary solutions they must convince people of the value of their proposals... Their role in the region is then necessarily one of incentive, initiative and education, much more favourable to the life of the region itself than if they had been given the means of carrying out their projects in a more autonomous and "technocratic" way.¹⁹

The New Town Authority is comprised of an "administrative council", of which half the members are

elected from local governmental authorities of the area designated for new town development. The remainder of the council is composed of central government civil service members. A president is elected from within the council to serve as spokesman for the new town, and a director-general guides the planning process with the consent of council. It is important to note that the Authority may act on behalf of both state and local municipalities since it is an administrative partnership composed of members from both sectors. This is expected to facilitate integration of the new town with its surrounding region.

Further integration is encouraged by the state through a compulsory political restructuring of the local communes (townships). This can take two forms: (1) a collective planning unit (syndicat communautaire d'aménagement) which is expected to ultimately become one "urban community" and governing body; or (2) the creation of a new commune on the territory of the new town to be managed during its initial stages by an urban 'assembly'. The first alternative is the one generally implemented, and it essentially is a type of "community of property limited to after-acquired property" in which all the tax revenues and expenditures on the equipment of the new town are pooled and administered by the syndicate.

At the central government level, the Central Group for New Towns, assisted by a small Secretariat, has the purpose of ensuring policy consistency at local levels,

and proposing measures to overcome any difficulties
encountered.²⁰

Financial resources for new towns are provided by numerous agencies at the national level. There are five principle funding agencies.²¹ These are: the Depository and Consignment Bank and its subsidiaries, the Central Territorial Equipment Company (SCET) and Central Building Company (SCIC); the Economic and Social Development Fund (FDES); the National Fund for Land Management and Urban Planning (FNAFU); and the Action Fund for Environmental Planning (FIAT). Unlike the British and American programs, provision of funds is not through one integrated agency but on a sectoral basis.

Funds are available for land acquisition through the FNAFU which provides grants and loans at 2.5 percent for two years, renewable for an additional two years. On the approval of the FDES, these funds are given to local communities and public-private companies to acquire land for ZUP's, ZAC's and industrial zones. For infrastructure, grants amounting to 25 percent may be received by communities from FNAFU. But since the elaboration of the Sixth Plan for modernization and public works (1970-1975), a program for new town equipment has been finalized. The importance of this is that all nine towns are part of a "goal-oriented" programme defined both in quantitative terms (number of dwellings to be built, value of facilities to be provided), and in qualitative terms. Hence, the annual appropriation

for subsidized housing and infrastructure is individualized at the national level and allocated to each region independently of the credit normally allocated to each district.

Pressman and Brace state:

This technical procedure is quite important, as it allows the new towns during their first five critical years, to plan programs in a comprehensive fashion so as not to be affected by the constant compromises with respect to the allocation of funding between departments and cities of the same region.²²

A policy is also being implemented by the Central Group for New Towns which systematizes the financing of public service facilities on a basis extending over several years in the context of the current national economic plan, and over a single year in connection with the preparation of the national budget. This policy is to ensure that public service facilities will be available when needed.

The programming of new town initiatives is facilitated to a great extent by the control of land under a ZAD (Zone d'Aménagement Différé) and its related institutional controls, ZUP (Zones à Urbaniser en Priorité), and ZAC (Zones d'Aménagement Concerté).²³ The object of ZAD is to allow the public body to control land speculation and to facilitate long term planning by forestalling immediate development. This is done by controlling the price of sales

between private individuals and by exercising a right of preemption up to 12 years (8 years plus a 4 year extension). ZAD's can be created by an administrative decree for the purposes of urban development, land banking, etc., and hence are the principle means of aggregating land for new community sites.

A ZUP is an area designed in a master plan for priority development. Once a ZUP has been approved by the Ministry of Public Works and Housing, and its financing has been endorsed by appropriate national agencies, then national funding for land acquisition and infrastructure requirements is directed there and refused to non-designated areas. Within a ZUP a municipality may pre-empt development for four years and then extend the period another two. When a owner wishes to sell, the owner must give first right of refusal to the municipality or designated developers at the price of land one year prior to ZUP approval.

A ZAC, first introduced in 1970, is much less used than a ZUP or ZAD. It is a tool used to assist the transformation of land from agricultural to urban use, and is normally proposed by a private group. A local municipality in a ZAC agreement may entrust a private group to develop the land with respect to both services and housing, and hence may be relieved of these costs usually borne by them.


None of these three lines of action is specific to new towns, but new towns do benefit considerably from them. They are tools which are used to assemble land on a large scale while ensuring minimal speculation and maximum flexibility.

In total there are nine sites designated for new town development - five in the Paris region and four in the provinces. At present studies have already been carried out and more than 25,000 acres of land have been acquired to implement the program. While none of the sites has actually reached completion (projections range from 10 to 25 years), many of the new towns are already in the construction stage. In the Paris region, programmes for the development of sewerage, water, and transportation facilities are underway or committed, and in some areas housing has already been built. For example, Pontoise, 25 kilometres north-west of Paris, has infrastructure complete: e.g. a motorway by-pass, electrification of rail services to Paris, telephone, sewerage for the first residential and industrial zones. Over 2,000 houses are complete and the university was finished in 1972. The first department store opened in 1971 and 30,000 square metres of shopping space were complete by 1973.

The most interesting aspect of the implementation process has been the adoption of flexible planning methods.

Figure IV-1

FRANCE



COUNTERBALANCING CAPITALS



TOWNS ASSIMILATED TO COUNTERBALANCING CAPITALS



SUPPORTING TOWNS IN THE PARIS BASIN



NEW TOWNS

--- ORGANISME D'ETUDES D'AIRE METROPOLITAINE OREAM

--- ORGANISME D'ETUDES DE VALLEES OREAV

For example at Le Vaudreuil, a special procedure of study and execution was defined in reference to qualitative targets and not in actual city project terms. The flexible approach was deemed by the authorities to be appropriate in order for plans to be adapted to different regional situations. This is perhaps why French new towns, unlike their early British prototypes, exhibit so much diversity as a group. However in adapting to regional variations, two groups of projects with very different objectives can be identified. First there are new towns in the context of discontinuous urban development - new towns that are physically distinct from the parent town (e.g. Le Vaudreuil, Melun-Senart, Cergy-Pontoise, Etang-de-Berre). The other group aims at organizing growth in continuity with the parent concentration (e.g. Trappes, Marne-la-Vallée, Evry, Villeneuve d'Ascq). In both cases, the form of the new town resembles more a network of interdependent settlement of 30,000 to 100,000 people separated by greenbelts, than the conventional "mass-type" new town.

As a group the French new towns are expected from 1975 on, to provide 7 to 8 percent of the total new housing constructed in France. It is thus evident that new towns are not expected to be a total panacea for the urban problems of France. But in the Paris region, it is anticipated that new towns will absorb close to one-third of the additional

TABLE IV-1

FRENCH NEW TOWNS
DESIGNATION, SIZE

New Town	Population (1975)	Proposed Capacity
1. Cergy-Pontoise (1966)	175,000	450,000
2. Evry (1966)	310,000	450,000
3. Lille-Est (1967) (Villeneuve d'Ascq)	n.k.	150,000
4. L'Isle d'Abeau	n.k.	200,000
5. Le Vaudreuil (1969)	n.k.	140,000
6. Marne-la-Vallée (1965)	n.k.	450,000
7. Rives de l'Etang de Berre -	n.k.	1,000,000
8. Melun Sénart	167,000	350,000
9. St. Quentin-en-Yvelines	120,000	275,000
Total		3,465,000

n.k. - not known

Source: N.E.P. Pressman, "Developing New Towns in France",
Plan Canada, Vol. 13, No. 1, 1973, p.27.

growth to the capital by the year 2000. It must also be remembered that new towns are only part of the regional strategies so far developed. Part of the growth is expected to be accommodated in expanded regional centres and small to medium-sized towns for which there is also government aid for housing and infrastructure development.

4.3 Goals of the French New Town Program

The French program for new towns is not a separate program in itself, but integrated as one of the components of the regional development strategies. It is for this reason that most of the goals of the program have not been explicitly stated. But from a review of the literature, it is possible to identify certain objectives which the new towns were designed to meet.

The main goals of the French program are depicted in Figure IV-2.

4.3.1 Spatial Goals

balancing the distribution of economic and demographic growth

One of the main objectives of the French new town program was to decentralize Paris and balance economic and demographic growth elsewhere throughout the country. The main approach used was to create "métropoles d'équilibre", by calling for the continued growth of the largest urban centres. Plans for these centres included the creation of four new towns. The means of implementing this objective was through an incentive program; i.e. industrial, commercial, and office space was restricted in Paris and subject to special permission and a levy system, and firms were encouraged to move to new growth centres where servicing would be provided and a ready market of labour would be available.

Figure IV-2

France
Goals of the French New Town Program

- | | |
|-----------------------------|---|
| <u>Spatial Goals</u> | <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. balancing the distribution of economic and demographic growth2. elimination of sprawl and restructuring of urban growth |
| <u>Socio-economic Goals</u> | <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. stimulation of regional economies and employment opportunities in depressed regions; creation of new towns with strong employment bases; economic interdependence of new town and region2. provision of a balanced urban environment for the new residents; increased quality of life |
| <u>Environmental Goals</u> | <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. minimization of urban nuisances and pollution2. preservation of open space in the metropolitan area |
| <u>Design Goals</u> | <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. innovation in urban structures2. adaptable and flexible approaches to planning3. urban aesthetics |


This goal was only partially achieved. Industrial employment remained stable in Paris during the Sixties, but growth was channelled elsewhere in the Region itself. Hence the result was only to decentralize activity from the core area and not from the Region. This was in part a result of the government's policy to create new towns very close to the city's perimeter, and "back-up" their development by decentralizing administrative and educational facilities. Some economic activities were encouraged to relocate in other parts of the country, but growth in the rest of France was nominal compared to that of the major urban regions.

elimination of sprawl and restructuring of urban growth

Under the policy adopted by the French government, growth was to be channelled into new towns and expanded centres in an attempt to redirect the concentric growth of the city. To create a unified urban region it was considered essential that the new towns be located on sites contiguous to the built-up areas. Evry, for example, was sited on virgin land at the junction of three urban areas. Figure IV-3 depicts the type of settlement pattern planned for the Paris area.

Sprawl was to be eliminated by creating relatively self-contained centres separated from the major urban centre by greenbelts. The urban structure of the Paris Region was to be multi-nucleated.

Figure IV-3
France
New Towns in the Paris Region



Paris Region Regional Scheme and New Towns

Source: N.E.P. Pressman and P. Brace, "Developing New Towns in France", Plan Canada, Vol. 13, No. 1, 1973, p.43

For all intents and purposes it appears that the French did succeed in restructuring urban growth within the context of their own goal definition. However the type of development pattern created did not minimize infrastructure costs for such services as transportation. Increased commuting occurred in the Paris region and pressures on the central core of Paris were not reduced. While population densities may have been altered within the region, it does not appear that the overall densities were decreased. Finally it might be suggested that while the urban structures were substantially changed, the actual socio-economic manifestations of sprawl were not.

4.3.2 Socio-economic Goals

stimulation of regional economies and employment opportunities in depressed regions; creation of new towns with strong employment bases; economic interdependence of new town and region

One of the main objectives of the French program was seen to be the stimulation of regional economies by upgrading the areas through employment opportunities. This goal was within the context of the French regional policies.

Areas were to be upgraded through the promotion of industrial growth and through the decentralization of economic activity from Paris. Industry was encouraged to relocate through a wide range of incentives: for example; tax concessions,

preferential rates for power and transportation, low interest loans, modernization grants, and training program grants. Special subsidized areas were also established outside Paris to attract growth from the urban centre. Furthermore it was felt that the shortage of well-serviced industrial zones in the major metropolitan areas, and the otherwise cramped conditions experienced by central city industrialists would encourage active decentralization.

A substantial amount of industry was actually encouraged to decentralize. Between 1962 and 1968 industrial employment in Paris remained stable while in France major, this sector exhibited a 12 percent growth rate.²⁴ This figure is misleading however. Industrial growth was encouraged in areas other than Paris, but mostly in the already prosperous areas. The new towns which did attract much of the industrial growth were located in regions immediately adjacent major centres, and hence did not contribute to the upgrading of depressed areas.

The new towns did succeed in generating relatively stable economic bases, with a variety of industry to support town employment. The central government's policy of decentralizing administrative and educational facilities also helped to diversify local economic bases. For example Evry and Cergy-Pontoise became 'perfectures' or administrative centres, hence increasing the number of tertiary sector jobs in these cities.

The French program also strived towards making new towns and their regions interdependent. This sub-goal was encouraged through the employment function. French new towns were not expected to become self-contained, as in the British sense. Rather in and out-commuting was accepted as a manifestation of "interdependence". For example at Evry, eight jobs were to be provided for every ten residents. Of these ten residents, six would work in the town and four would commute so that one job in four would be occupied by a non-resident. This balance, allowing for partial commuting, was considered to be in line with the principle of freedom of choice. Major commuter links were proposed to facilitate daily migration patterns.

Economic interdependence was achieved to a substantial degree, but seemingly at the expense of further infrastructure expenditures on transportation.

provision of a balanced urban environment for the new residents; increased quality of life

In the "directives for the development of the new towns in the Paris Region" (1966), Mr. Georges Pompidou stated;

...The preparation of the master scheme for the development of the Paris Region and the structural schemes for big counter-balancing capitals has demonstrated the need,...to arrange for the creation of veritable "new towns" as a part of a general effort to humanize, order and control the movement of urbanization...

They should provide their residents with the same opportunities for employment, leisure, and cultural development as those offered by the older concentrations.²⁵

It was clearly the intent of the French planners to provide an answer to the urbanization problem beyond the scale of the "dormitory centre" or "grand ensemble". It was considered essential that a complete spectrum of housing, employment opportunities, public facilities and community services be provided. It was to be an environment of high quality, satisfactory to the incoming residents, but yet efficient in terms of resource use. These requirements or goals might have led to the creation of a "model" city, but on the contrary only general guidelines were provided to structure the implementation of any scheme. The main guideline was notably the regrouping, at high densities, of central facilities in designated urban hubs to foster a fully animated urban setting. The actual directives were left flexible enough such that each community could be tailored according to geographic, political, and economic constraints. Nevertheless, the actual product which resulted represented individual approaches aimed to satisfy one goal: the provision of a balanced urban environment.

By all observations it appears as though this goal has been achieved. A variety of housing is being constructed, including individual units and public-owned complexes.²⁶ Employment is available in secondary and tertiary sectors. Commercial and recreational facilities are well developed and available to both residents and those inhabiting the surrounding region.

One of the reasons that the new towns (particularly those in the Paris area) have succeeded from the outset in providing a "complete environment" is because of the already existing suburban market. This 'support' makes it possible for them to launch major central activities at the outset: commercial centres, cinemas, and cultural facilities - which to date have been lacking in the suburban "dormitories". Support populations are available in the neighbouring communes.

4.3.3 Environmental Goals

minimization of urban nuisances and pollution

The problems of urban nuisances and pollution are of concern to the French new town planners, and special studies are being conducted at Les Rives-de-l'Etang-de-Berre aimed at reducing the pollution associated with a steel and petrochemical plant situated on a mediterranean bay. Similarly the central government in collaboration with U.S. officials is using the site of Le Vaudreuil as a pilot project to minimize pollution.

preservation of open space in the urban area

Although not explicit in the general literature for French new communities, the goal of preservation of open space within the urban area is implicitly taken into account in the actual plan formulation stage. Open space is given

the distinction of being natural wooded areas, lake surface, and recreation space both around and within the actual community.

Many of the French new towns have considerable acreages devoted to open space. For example, in the plan for Marne-la-Vallée, of a total area of 16,200 hectares, 2,800 hectares are devoted to park land and wooded area in the non-urban area, and 600 hectares of green open space in the built-up area. This represents 20 percent of the total area. Likewise the actual plans for Cergy-Pontoise, provide for the construction of the new town along the Oise river with Lagoon-type reservoirs for canoeing, fishing, etc.

4.3.4 Design Goals

innovation in urban structures; adaptable and flexible approach to planning; urban aesthetics

For the purposes of brief discussion, these three goals are treated as separate facets of one goal-"innovation".

The goal of innovation in new towns has never been clearly defined, but indeed is implicitly important and characteristic of the French program. A reference was made to it by M. Georges Pompidou former Prime Minister in the "directives for the development of the new towns in the Paris Region".

...these new towns, created progressively under an overall plan, will ensure the coherent articulation of varied quarters of different

types of architecture and housing around an attractive and modern centre.²⁷

The only precise objective expressed in this passage was for the creation of attractive and modern town centres. An analysis of the projects under way discloses a much broader treatment of the term "innovation" and suggests additional connotations to be in terms of technological and aesthetic criteria.

This goal has been furthered by the flexible approach that has been adopted by the French. Rather than defining a new town according to some "a priori" model, the approach has been to provide general directives and leave considerable margins for adapting each project to the particular economic and geographic realities of the site. The result has been diversity in new town schemes. J.P. Lacaze stated:

This diversity results from the challenge, in varying degrees of certain basic principles of traditional town planning: systematic zoning is challenged by the need to inter-relate functions, the rigidity hierarchy of neighbourhood centres, district centres and principle centres is challenged by the flexible super-imposition of differentiated services and so forth.²⁸

The common desire to integrate urban functions has been the strongest link connecting new towns. Instead of planning segregated block developments characterized by single uses, the French have attempted to integrate and blend functions at different levels. For example, at the level of the town centre, attempts have been made to combine all types of

activities: sports facilities, housing, commercial shops, administration, and business, etc., in an effort to animate old town centre atmosphere. To encourage this effort and minimize the problems associated with resident integration in this type of scheme, the public corporations have assigned great priority to the design of such centres and in some cases design competitions have been held; for example for the multi-function regional shopping centre at Cergy-Pontoise and Evry, and for the 4000-dwelling unit town centre of Vaudreuil. Architectural quality of the new town projects has been enhanced through the support of the Ministry for Cultural Affairs and by the "Construction Plan" launched by the Ministry of Equipment and Housing.²⁹

Technological innovation has been encouraged by several central and regional government bodies. The Ministry of Transport and the Paris Regional District have guided research into problems of public transport.³⁰

Three major experiments are nearing completion: the construction of the Evry 'own track' system, the development of the air-cushioned railway line which by 1976 will link Cergy-Pontoise to La Défense, and the construction of the first European fully automated public transport line which will link Lille-Est with Lille by the end of 1975. Likewise the new town of Le Vaudreuil has been operating in the role of a "nuisance-free town" under a pollution study sponsored

by the Ministry of the Environment and supervised by the Inter-Ministerial Committee.

The ambition to make new towns experiments in innovation has been summed up by the Commission on New Towns (Vith Plan).

...the new town can be a testing ground in the best sense of the term. In other words it is not all-permissive, it cannot be the refuge of futurism or utopianism; but precisely because it imposes social, economic, and technical constraints, it makes it possible to tackle lucidly and in concrete fashion some of the key problems of urban life in our times.³¹

The experimental and innovative character of the first achievements is significant. Because the new towns have had a considerable amount of "cheap" land, and could draw support from numerous agencies for common projects, the new communities have been almost ideal testing grounds for the development and management of large integrated projects and for the encouragement of new relationships and co-operation between various levels of government.

4.4 Summary

The French new town program has never been part of a national urban policy. Rather new towns have been used as instruments for effecting development policies on a regional level, and more particularly as a means by which economic and demographic growth could be decentralized within a certain region and as a means by which depressed area could be

upgraded. The impetus for the designation of new towns has come from local officials and regional bodies, and the central government has acted merely as an administrative overseer for the implementation of regional development plans.

New town initiatives in France to date have had certain distinguishable dimensions. First new towns have been built through public sector-private sector co-operation, with the development corporation providing service infrastructure and land, and the private developers constructing housing. Secondly new communities have been exemplified by a multi-nucleated settlement pattern, with each community contained physically by a greenbelt but linked so as to maximize social, economic, and political interdependence with the surrounding communes. Thirdly, their implementation has been furthered by both positive and negative incentives - i.e. industrial incentive scheme, land use control, etc.

Even the oldest of the new towns is still in infancy, therefore it may be too early to pass final judgment on the program. But growing pains are prevalent, and a survey of the literature indicates that several major obstacles have hindered new town progress.

One of the major problems has been public acceptance. Support for the program has been slow to develop and some feel that new towns will only become large dormitory centres for the parent metropolis. To others new towns suggest

radical forms and urban structures unrelated to the needs and preferences of the inhabitants.

Similarly regional officials have been less than enthusiastic in some instances to promote new towns as a growth strategy, perhaps because of scale, or perhaps because of the unknown impact the new town will have on the parent city.

New town progress has also been hindered by the lack of a co-ordinated financial support system. As it was stated earlier, there exists no centralized body responsible for the administration and financing of new town programs. Funds are available from many different bodies in the central bureaucracy, and this has complicated considerably the task of assembling large amounts of money to implement the complex new town process.

Finally because new town programs are not separate administratively, many of the tools used in the implementation process are not designed specifically to facilitate new town initiatives. For example, ZAD, a land use planning tool is being used to assemble land for new communities. The difficulty arises in determining the appropriately sized area of a ZAD. Too small an area encourages speculation for future extensions, while too large an area is inefficient and a waste of public funds.

In spite of these problems, the French new town approach has been both innovative in terms of design, and workable in terms of integrating local and national representation in regional strategy planning. The French example provides substantially a different means of viewing how new communities initiatives could be structured.

Footnotes

- 1 L. Rodwin, The British New Towns Policy: Problems and Implications, (Cambridge, 1956), p.158
- 2 *ibid.*, p.159
- 3 IFHP Bulletin, "Les Villes Nouvelles", 1973, p.68
- 4 Rodwin, *Supra* note 1, at p.161-162
- 5 *ibid.*, p.28
- 6 D. Hughes, "New-Town Progress in France", Town and Country Planning, Vol. 39, January 1971, p.79
- 7 Rodwin, *Supra* note 1, at p.167
- 8 "Les Villes Nouvelles", *Supra* note 3, at p.67
- 9 Rodwin, *Supra* note 1, at p.169
- 10 *ibid.*, p.178
- 11 "grands ensembles" was the typical sprawl development that occurred in the Paris Region after the war. They were essentially composed of flats, with amenities such as schools and shops at a bare minimum. The population structure of the 'grands ensembles' were very one-sided, workers forming the largest group.
"Les Villes Nouvelles", IFHP Bulletin 1973
- 12 IAURP- Institut d'Aménagement d'Urbanisme de la Région Parisienne
- 13 P. Merlin, New Towns, (London, 1971), p.148
- 14 "Les Villes Nouvelles", *Supra* note 3, at p.71
- 15 J.P. Lacaze, "The Role of the French New Towns in Regional Development and Regional Life", Report to the Vth Congress of the International Council of Regional Economies, 1972, p.3
- 16 *ibid.*, p.5
- 17 N.E.P. Pressman and P. Brace, "Developing New Towns in France", Plan Canada, Vol. 13, No. 1, 1973, T.P.I.C., p.30

- 18 R.E. Roullier, "French New Towns and Innovation", Central Group for New Towns, 1973, p.3
- 19 J.P. Lacaze, Supra note 15, at pp. 11-12
- 20 J.E. Rouiller, Supra note 18, at p.5
- 21 N.E.P. Pressman, Supra note 17, at p.37 for a discussion of the development and financing functions of these bodies see L. Rodwin, pp. 170-182.
- 22 *ibid.*, p.37
- 23 *ibid.*, p.36.
see also L. Gertler, The Process of New City Planning and Building, University of Waterloo, 1974, section 3.3; and D. Kinsey, "The French ZUP Technique of Urban Development", A.I.P. Journal, No. 1969, pp. 369-375
- 24 Les Villes Nouvelles, Supra note 3, at p.68
- 25 R.E. Rouiller, Supra note 18, at p.6
- 26 for example, at Cergy-Pontoise "Logements" individual represent 29.1 per cent of the authorized housing units while "logements collectifs" represent 70.9 per cent.
- 27 R.E. Rouiller, Supra note 18, at p.6
- 28 J.P. Lacaze, "The Role of the French New Towns in Regional Development", 1972, p.9
- 29 R.E. Rouiller, Supra note 18, at p.10
- 30 *ibid.*, p.12
- 31 *ibid.*, p.14

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V Australia

5.1 Problem Statement

The major issue facing the Australian government is the massive concentration of population in very few cities. Of a total population of 12.7 million in 1971, 47 percent inhabited the three largest centres.¹ Furthermore in a recent study by the Commonwealth Bureau of Roads, it was estimated that of the 9 million people to be added to Australia's present population, 7 million would locate in the five major urban centres. This highly unbalanced growth is symptomatic of many of the problems of urban Australia: rapid growth and sprawl, increased population concentration in a few centres with strain on local services; increasing urban/rural imbalance of political powers, questions of housing and poverty, stagnation and decline of small inland towns from out-migration.

Regional inequalities do exist but unlike in Canada, they appear to be localized within rather than between states, and tend to be more limited in number and spacial scale. Because of the relatively balanced economies interregionally, the national government has been less prompted to intervene.

Intense state rivalry for economic growth has exacerbated the problem of urban concentration since competition for industry and foreign investment has meant that a state

will hesitate to control land-use and industrial location for fear of losing potential "customers".² The result has been an agglomeration of industry in a limited number of locations, continuing to attract and enlarge work forces at the expense of the surrounding hinterland.

Despite the problems enumerated above, the Australians probably have few very serious issues by international standards. Consequently inducements for change have been less, and it has only been very recently that new communities have been suggested as a means to structure urban growth.

5.2 The Policy Response

In Australia reaction against urbanization became explicit in the 1940's. Originally the impetus for decentralization was expressed in terms of halting rural-urban migration, an action motivated by rural politicians whose political power base was being eroded. But the rationale for government policies relating to the redistribution of population was related to several other factors over time. It ranged from national development for defense purposes in a "develop the north" philosophy, to strong views about the moral and physical benefits of country life. In more recent years the "decentralization movement" has been spurred by the prospects for the future quality of life in urban centres. But as early as 1944 the Commonwealth Housing Commission urged the central government to decentralize industry and create "satellite towns" because of the deteriorating living conditions in the major cities.³

Early opposition to urbanization took the form of "back-to-the-land" movements. Government controls and incentives were directed to policies of "closer settlement", which meant transplanting people from the cities to farms rather than self-sufficient rural new towns.⁴ "Closer settlement" as a policy of decentralization failed because of the capital intensive changes that were occurring in the agricultural industry. In more recent years, new policies have aimed at stimulating selected towns as regional growth centres; but this change in policy has been gradual since "closer settlement" was continued as a policy into the 1960's.

Between the early 1940's and mid 1960's various inducements were offered to encourage decentralization. Individual state governments offered a wide range of industrial incentives to relocate in rural centres. Government departments were actually established in many states to implement this policy. But reviews of the progress of decentralization policies lead to the conclusion that such policies were not overly successful. Failure can be attributed to several factors. First, decentralization policies were non-selective, and therefore less than the optimum was achieved since increments to many small towns failed to produce agglomeration of activities to the point where these centres could become 'self-generating' and spontaneous growth centres. In the mid-Sixties, some thought was given to implementing policies

for selective decentralization although it was little more than "lip service". A second reason for the failure of early decentralization programs was that there was no initiative taken by the Commonwealth government.

In 1965 institutional recognition of the decentralization problem came from several of the states. New South Wales established the Department of Decentralization and Development, and Victoria set up a Decentralization Advisory Committee. Much of the policy developed by these bodies was concerned with the influence of industrial location, and the incentives included loans and/or guarantees for construction, subsidies for related industrial services and write-downs for land or factory space. Victoria also selected five centres as new growth points: Ballarat, Bendigo, Wadonga, Portland, and a complex of five centres in the La Trove Valley east of Melbourne.⁵ But little more than initial designation took place.

Bourne indicates that inaction on the part of both the Commonwealth and state governments has been more a problem of justification for decentralization than anything else. A joint Commonwealth/State Committee commented:

The studies co-ordinated by the Committee have not produced clear evidence of an overriding economic advantage or disadvantage from the national viewpoint arising from continuous centralization of population and economic activity in major coastal cities.

Committee of Commonwealth/State
Officials (1972): Report
of the Commonwealth/State
Officials on Decentralization

It is not difficult to see then why debate about new communities has not arisen until most recently.

5.2.1 Evolution of New Cities Policy

Prior to the early 1970's a "new towns" approach was not considered a potential policy alternative for effecting decentralization. Apart from the company towns built for resource extraction, the new towns that had gained recognition were Canberra, a site developed to be the national capital, Elizabeth developed by the South Australian government and Cambellton planned by the New South Wales State Planning Authority but to be developed privately. With the exception of Canberra, (a city approaching 200,000, 150 miles from Sydney), these towns were actually suburban extensions.

Prior to the Seventies several reports of various government agencies advocated a new communities approach to the problem of urban decentralization, but little action was taken and then only with very specific objectives in mind. But in 1972, a task report on new cities was prepared by the Australian Institute of Urban Studies and it contained many comprehensive suggestions as to how a program might be implemented on a national scale.⁶ It proposed two types of new centres-regional cities and system cities. Regional cities were to be new communities located far enough from existing centres to be independent or "self-contained",

and for a minimum of 10,000 to 150,000 people. System cities, with a minimum of 150,000 to 250,000, were proposed for areas or "urban fields" within the sphere of large metropolitan areas and were intended to form part of a new "multi-centred" metropolitan region. It was suggested that system cities would benefit from close proximity to existing services and employment opportunities while serving as counter-magnets and checks to sprawl. They represented the evolution of a selective decentralization policy. The report projected a need for sixteen new cities by the year 2010, nine of which would have 100,000 to 250,000 people and seven with 250,000 - 500,000.

The so-called system city concept however has met with wide criticism. Many feel that although system cities would initially be physically separate from the original centre, in time they would necessarily become fully integrated and their purpose would be self-defeating.

Following the 1972 report, the government established the National Urban and Regional Development Authority (N.U.R.D.A) now called the Cities Commission. NURDA was intended to foster both sub-metropolitan growth centres ("system" cities) and regional growth centres in a national program for urban and regional development. The intent of the policy was to identify alternative locations for growth and to assist the structuring of metropolitan areas into planned systems of inter-related but separate cities. Later in 1972 the New Labour Government

created the Department of Urban and Regional Development to aid in carrying out the development strategy.

The new cities program was one component of the strategy. The rationale behind it was one of reducing the rates of growth in the major urban centres, particularly in Sydney and Melbourne which had been growing at a rate of 50,000 new inhabitants a year. Twelve areas were chosen for study by N.U.R.D.A., and on the basis of the studies that were prepared, a five-year program of expenditure was outlined for all new city projects throughout Australia. The program was based on the support for a number of areas, many of which were designated earlier by certain state governments. The various areas and amount of support are presented in Table V-1.

Neilson specified that in 1973-74, a total budget of \$33 million was set aside for new community programs in seven areas. Of this \$28 million was allocated for land acquisition.⁷ However, the expenditure of this sum was under the constraint that the State Government introduce land price stabilization legislation in the designated areas, and indicate support in the form of other commitments.

What has occurred to date?

A number of states have introduced or have announced their intention to introduce land stabilization legislation - New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Western Australia.

TABLE V-1
AUSTRALIA
DESIGNATED NEW COMMUNITY SITES

Designated Areas	1971 Population	Target Population 2010	Government finan- cing 1973-74 Amount	Purpose of Fu
Townsville & Fitzroy Region	68,000	200,000	\$4.4m	- land acqui- sition, ser- icing, soci- facilities
Bathurst/Orange	80,000	200,000	\$2.0m	-
Albury-Wodonga	38,000	300,000	\$9.0m	- land acqui- sition, pub- works for social infr- structure
Greelong	122,000	273,000	\$5.0m	- land acqui- sition
Monarto	-----	170,000	\$1.2m	- land acqui- sition
Salvado	-----	80-320,000	\$3.5m	- land acqui- sition
Gosford/Wyong Holsworthy/Camp- belltown	89,000	344-500,000	\$7.4m	- land acqui- sition site development
Tanzania	-----	-----	\$0.5m	- assistance for estab- lishment and operations State Plann- Commission
TOTAL			----- \$33.0m	

Source: L. Neilson, "The New Cities Program", Royal Australian
Planning Institute Journal, Jan. 1974.

For example, the Land Control Bill that was introduced in Western Australia was to extend powers to acquire land at values existing on a nominal date plus increments tied to the index of inflation. Planning and development studies have been proceeding in several areas with financial and technical assistance from the Cities Commission. As well, a Development Corporation Bill was introduced in certain states which would place nominated lands under the control of a development corporation, and would give the corporation powers to plan, develop, and administer the area. Finally in Western Australia, a bill proposing to establish a Land Commission was introduced into the legislature. The Land Commission would be invested with state-wide powers to acquire, develop, and manage land for development.

The actual payments to states for implementing the new communities program were \$42.9 million in 1973-74 representing \$3.31 per capita.⁸ The amount budgeted for 1974-75 was \$92.8 million or \$7.17 per capita, over double the previous year's figure. The discrepancy between these figures and Neilson's, is that some of these latter funds are distributed to both new communities and existing municipalities, and hence the actual new community program expenditures are unfortunately obscured.

The Department of Urban and Regional Development (D.U.R.D.) also provided assistance to growth centres to the

the amount of \$5.8 million in 1973-74 (\$0.45 per capita), and budgeted \$40.8 million for the past year (\$3.15 per capita), representing a sizeable increase in commitment. The Department subsidized land acquisition in 1973-74 for \$15 million (\$1.16 per capita) and estimated 1974-75 expenditures to be \$47.9 million (\$3.70 per capita). An additional \$6 million was appropriated for the Albury-Wodonga project in 1973-74, with estimates of \$5.2 million stated for 1974-75. In total then, the amount of aid expended for new community construction and assistance to growth centres was \$69.7 million (or \$5.38 per capita) in 1973-74, while pledges for the following year almost tripled earlier figures at \$186.7 million (or \$14.41 per capita). These commitments by the national government fall far short of the comparable figures for Britain (1971 - total aid \$2.4 billion or \$44.14 per capita), but do signify a growing commitment by the Australian government to support new community initiatives. The lack of information on state government subsidies however precludes a full assessment of financial support for the program. The impact of the program to date is not obvious. But if the population forecasts indicated in Table V-1 are met, then approximately one million people over and above "normal growth" would be accommodated by the year 2000 in areas presently designated under the New Cities Program. In comparison to a total expected population increase of 9 million over the next twenty-five years, this figure appears modest.

The major implication of the Australian New Cities Program is that if implemented fully, it will have a major impact on the character of urban development. It could greatly affect population distribution particularly on a state-wide basis, and it could lead to more co-ordination of efforts by government bodies at both state and Commonwealth levels.

But signs of increasing co-operation in the form of new community initiatives are already apparent and deserve comment.

In 1973 the federal government and the state governments of New South Wales and Victoria set up a joint federal-state development corporation to develop a growth centre at Albury-Wodonga. Public ownership of land was a major feature of the program, and because the Australian constitution limited the powers of federal expropriation, the states were obliged to establish land acquisition authorities to purchase and assemble land for development. These state corporations were also responsible for providing municipal-type services and for levying charges in the new urban areas for the greenfields development.

The Albury-Wodonga development agreement specified also a number of important financial relationships. The Development Corporation was to be responsible for co-ordinating all the relevant planning and funding authorities at the national, state, and local government levels. It was also required to assess the relative cost priorities and present them in the form of a five-year rolling development plan so as to ensure the efficient

long-term allocation of public resources. The basic divisions for financial responsibility between the Commonwealth and State governments was announced July 4, 1974 by the Ministerial Council:

...The Australian Government will finance land acquisition and land development. These costs will be met by interest bearing advances from the Australian government. Subject to negotiation, the payment of interest may be deferred for a period; the interest for that period would be capitalized into subsequent repayments. As a basic principle the advances will be repaid and Albury-Wodonga will be self-supporting in a financial sense.

...to overcome the problems of rapid rise in population and also to provide services and facilities of the highest quality from the earliest stages, special Federal grants or long term loans will be needed during the early years. However the State Government will be required to provide services to keep pace with the accelerated growth of Albury-Wodonga beyond this initial phase.

...The States accept the responsibility to provide their services and facilities to a timetable to be determined by the Development Corporation. The provision of these services will be in line with the rate of growth approved by the Ministerial Council.

...The administrative expenses of the Development Corporation will be shared equally by the three Governments.⁹

It is therefore apparent, that the financing system is one in which development corporations are given advances to implement their development schemes, but with the exception of special grants to provide community facilities, the amount of the loan plus interest is expected to be repaid.

In addition to direct financing arrangements with the Cities Commission, supplementary support may be available in the following areas: Commonwealth Aid Road agreements, Commonwealth-State Housing agreements, subsidies for urban public transport, sewerage works, land commissions and assistance for the National Estate.

The final dimension of the Albury-Wodonga project which is of interest is the development function. The development corporation carries out the physical servicing of the land and creates the operating infrastructure. The land is then developed by the government agency or released to the private entrepreneur. The major constraint on land development is the type of land tenure allowed. For residential sites land tenure is free-hold, granted for a particular block of land and specific type of use. This type of free-hold does not permit redevelopment for more intensive residential use, for retail, commercial, or industrial use. Land for these latter three uses is held under a leasehold system.

5.3 GOALS OF THE NEW CITIES PROGRAM

The Australian program is too recently implemented to provide any "hard" results. Nevertheless it is possible to identify policy directions and factors that will be taken into consideration in attempting to achieve the stated goals. For simplicity the goals have been grouped under the following categories: spatial, socio-economic, design, environmental, and political. The major goals are presented in Figure V-1.

Figure V-1

AUSTRALIA

GOALS OF THE NEW CITIES PROGRAM

Spatial
Goals

1. reduction of the metropolitan primacy of Melbourne and Sydney

Socio-economic
Goals

1. creation of self-contained regional centres with strong economic bases
2. development of balanced communities at least possible cost: increased efficiency in the urban use of public sector resources
3. generation of a greater choice of lifestyles: greater equity in the distribution of urban activities and services

Environmental
Goals

1. protection of the environment, conservation and enhancement

Design Goals

1. creation of an aesthetically pleasing environment

Political Goals

1. encouragement of greater participation by all levels of government.

5.3.1 SPATIAL GOALS

reduction of the metropolitan primacy of Melbourne and Sydney

The Australian government has stated that any action to alleviate metropolitan growth problems would be more effective if the rate of growth of certain centres, particularly Melbourne and Sydney, was to be reduced. To achieve this goal it has proposed the development of regional growth centres to act as counter-magnets, and the creation of system cities to check sprawl. But the achievement of this presupposes the successful integration of national, state, and local policies so as to change the relative attractiveness of Sydney and Melbourne as sites for future expansion. It will also require a strong incentive approach to encourage growth in the designated areas.

There is no indication as yet if this goal will be achieved. The first step in the process is the recognition of the scale of population growth required. If only 25 percent of the anticipated growth of Sydney and Melbourne is to be accommodated in regional centres, this will involve the development of facilities for some 600,000 people elsewhere by the year 2001. To date the government has designated areas with population targets ranging from a low of 1 million

to a high of 1.5 million net of present existing residents. Albury-Wodonga situated between the two centres, is expected to accommodate a net increase of 250,000 by the year 2010. Campbellton and Gosford/Wyong in the Sydney Region are planned for 344,000 to 500,000 residents in total; Geelong in the Melbourne area is planned for an additional 150,000.

In spite of what appears to be an optimistic start, the government policies even if fully realized, will not have a substantial impact in terms of population distribution for many years. Proposals for major regional centres away from the coast will suffer from high development costs (water supply, transportation) and lower amenity potential. Furthermore rural settlement densities at present are extremely low in many of the designated areas, and hence will provide little support in terms of service population. Finally much depends on the active participation of the state and local governments, for it is they who must control sprawl through land use controls around the major areas, and also must provide servicing as it is needed in the new communities.

5.3.2 Socio-economic Goals

creation of self-contained regional centres with strong economic bases

In order to effect a better distribution of population it is considered essential that regional centres be developed which are relatively self-contained and which have strong economic bases. Self-contained in the Australian sense, is taken to mean that employment opportunities will be provided for the residents, and that a complete range of community services will be developed.

The means by which a strong economic base will be developed have not been fully investigated by the Australian officials, but the Task Force on New Cities for Australia recommended the following criteria to be used in guiding the development of one.

Section 4.8 To serve a new city of at least 150,000 people, the economic base should ideally:

- (a) be large enough to support not less than 150,000 people;
- (b) be able to earn income from outside the immediate region;
- (c) be diversified so as to avoid vulnerability to the fluctuating fortunes of particular industries;
- (d) have a pattern of base industries that will support local ancilliary services at reasonable cost;
- (e) be able to present a balanced range of job opportunities (to meet various ages, skills, sexes, etc.)

- (f) have industries with products that incur low transport costs in relation to their value.

It is expected that employment opportunities will not only be provided by secondary and tertiary industry, but by government, education, and tourism. To encourage the development of a sound economic base, certain incentives have been proposed. These are: freight assistance, telephone charge assistance, payroll and land-tax concessions, and good labour supply. Some of these incentives however are beyond the power of the Australian government and will require state approval for their implementation. Incentives to attract people to the new community include: good publicity and information services, good quality reasonably priced housing including some low cost housing, financial assistance to move, on-and-off job training assistance, good community facilities, etc. Part of the success of creating a strong economic base and viable social community is expected to come from enthusiasm generated by the speed and scale of the program.

To date the New South Wales State Government has established its own Industrial Promotion Service as part of the Department of Decentralization and Development.¹⁰ This Service acts as a central liaison point between government and industry, and has as its aim, to promote balanced industrial development within the state. The incentive system as it has been established, is based more on promotional techniques of a less interventionist nature than its British counterpart. Under the State Development and Country Industries Assistance Act, general loans and subsidies

are available to industries to build or expand a plant in specific areas. These loans and subsidies are provided from a country Industries Assistance Fund, and are available for the following uses: purchase of industrial land, construction of factories, plant equipment, unskilled worker training, housing for employees, freight rate concessions, and guarantees up to 90 percent of the total cost of the country industrial projects. Professional assistance is also available to provide economic analysis of potential sites, including a survey of market, recognized growth industries, experience of existing industries, transportation cost schedules, etc. Finally, local councils are also empowered to lend money to new and expanding industries for land acquisition or building construction.

increased efficiency in the urban use of public sector resources: development of balanced communities at least possible cost

It is the intended goal of the growth management program that there be increased efficiency in the urban use of public sector resources. In 1966 Lansdown estimated that the total public and private cost for establishing community services in a regional centre was \$7000 per capita, as compared to \$10,000 per capita for existing urban areas in New South Wales. In 1971 the N.S.W. Department of Decentralization and Development concluded that \$120 million would be saved on infrastructure provision between 1971 and 2000 if five regional growth centres

were established to absorb Sydney's projected growth. Earlier in 1969 the same department had found that the overall cost disadvantage of a country location was 92 cents per \$100 of sales. However these "minimum cost" figures are misleading to some extent. Richardson stated:

Most empirical work has looked at how expenditures per head change with increases in population, but this throws light on scale economies only if demand is inelastic; what is really needed are measures of the influence of unit costs on homogeneous output.

Alonzo added:

The argument of minimum costs is insufficient in its own terms. Such an objective is sensible only if output per capita is constant. But in fact, it appears that output per capita is an increasing function of urban size. In that case a more sensible objective of public policy would deal with the relation of outputs and inputs, rather than only with inputs.

In the terms of developing communities at least possible cost, it is expected that substantial savings will be achieved through economies of scale and through cheaper land costs. The Australians have accepted the notion that the minimum threshold for experiencing cost efficiency is not less than 150,000 residents.

generation of a greater choice of lifestyles: greater equity in the distribution of urban activities and services

This goal is expected to be realized to a great extent by the development of system cities within the spatial influence of the metropolis. The form would be akin to a system of interconnected centres; i.e. the development of a multi-nucleated megalopolis. The systems centre concept is expected to give

a choice to residents in terms of differing housing types, more diverse employment opportunities, etc.

At the same time it is expected that system cities and regional growth centres will contribute both to a greater distribution of urban activities and services in a spatial sense. But the context of this goal is such that a complete tradeoff is not made between efficiency and equity - that economic growth will still be encouraged in the metropolitan areas through system cities, and not be totally diverted to the development of the poorer regions.

5.3.3 Environmental Goal

protection of the environment, conservation and enhancement

It is the implicit intent of the Australian government that environmental criteria be taken into consideration in the planning of new towns. The only manifestation of this goal to date has been the requirement that an environmental impact statement be prepared to assess the impact of development decisions in the proposed Albury-Wodonga project. A Task Force comprised of consultants and appointed by the Cities Commission, has been given the duty of completing this study.

5.3.4 Design Goal

creation of an aesthetically pleasing environment

The experiences of the Canberra project have done much to illuminate the result when physical planning goals are held as

paramount to the success of the project. The fact that the National Capital Development Corporation was given a relatively unlimited budget allowed planners to waste resources in pursuing aesthetic goals.

With the present new communities program, it appears that the design goal will be consciously superceded by efficiency criteria. Because the scale of the intended program is much larger, and thus incorporates more actors, there will be more controls on expenditures. That is not to say that design will not play an important part since like the Americans, the Australians are encouraging a voluntary movement of people to the regional centres, and aesthetics will no doubt be one drawing card.

5.3.5 POLITICAL GOAL


encouragement of greater participation by all levels of government

The Australian program is evolving in such a way as to represent one of the few new community schemes to actively incorporate national and state government resources. For example at Albury-Wodonga, the commonwealth government has the responsibility of financing land acquisition and land development. The State governments must provide services for the proposed sites. Commonwealth-State co-operation has been necessitated in part by the following three factors, and facilitated by a fourth:

- (1) the constitutional limits on the powers of the federal government to purchase land (normally under state jurisdiction);
- (2) the siting of new communities such that they straddle state borders (hence requiring inter-state co-ordination);
- (3) the financing powers of the Commonwealth government (hence a chief source of funds for the project); and
- (4) the creation of joint federal-state development corporations which are responsible for co-ordinating relevant

planning and funding authorities at the national, state, and local government levels.

The fact that the development corporation for Albury-Wodonga consists of 5 members - 1 from the Australian government, 2 state representatives, and 2 part-time representatives from the local community indicates the intent of the program to encourage greater participation by all levels of government. The total administrative organization for this proposed new community is presented below and provides further proof of commitment to this goal.



5.4 Summary

It is too early to evaluate the Australian policy as yet, but some distinguishing traits are already apparent. New city building is within the context of a "greenfields" approach as well as an expanded centre concept. Development is carried out by private enterprise but on land owned and serviced by the state. The Commonwealth's only obligation is for financial aid and technical advice.

At present there is little evidence of a national settlement policy emerging, despite the federal government's commitment to the projects. The federal government has merely lent support to a program which has been for the most part state-initiated. The new communities program seemingly then has at present a regional context, but merely in a political sense. The only device open to the Commonwealth government to effect a national policy is through a co-operative arrangement with the state governments, with the former establishing growth guidelines and the latter organizing and carrying out the physical planning. Considering the current independence of the states, this will not be an easy task.

Footnotes

- 1 L. Bourne, Regulating Urban Systems: A Comparative Review of National Urbanization Strategies, Australia, Canada, Britain, Sweden, draft copy, August 1973, p.6
- 2 ibid., p.54
- 3 L. Neilson, Cities Commission, "The New Cities Program", Royal Australian Planning Institute Journal, January 1974, p.25
- 4 A.J. Robinson, Economics and New Towns: Comparative Study, United States, United Kingdom, and Australia, (New York, 1975), p.113
- 5 Bourne, Supra note 1, at p.61
- 6 Australian Institute of Urban Studies, First Report of the Task Force on New Cities for Australia, "Efficient and Humane Alternatives to Overconcentrated Growth", (Canberra, 1972)
- 7 Neilson, Supra note 3
- 8 Department of Urban and Regional Development, Budget Paper, No. 8, 1974-75
- 9 Cities Commission, 2nd Annual Report, July 1, 1973-June 30, 1974, Australian Government Publication Service
- 10 New South Wales, Industrial Promotion Services Department of Decentralization and Development, Booklet entitled: "How to Encourage Industry in Country Centres", no date

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VI CONCLUSION

6.1 Summary

In view of the interest of MSUA in the implementation of a federal new community strategy in Canada, a brief summary chart has been prepared to provide a synopsis of new community experiences in the four countries under study.

Figure VI-1

NEW COMMUNITIES PROGRAMS
& POLICY CONTEXT: A
COMPARATIVE SYNOPSIS

Criteria	Britain	United States	France	Australia
1. Type of Government	unitary	federal	unitary	federal
2. Population total (million)	55.9 (1974)	203 (1972)		12.7 (1971)
average growth rate		3.2% (1970-1973)	23.5% post war (1945-1968)	
3. New Communities Program				
enabling Act	New Towns Act (1946) Town Development Act 1952	National Housing Act (1965) Title X, IV, VII	-	Cities Commission Act (1972-3)
year of initiation	1946	1966	1965	1973
administering authority	Min. of Environment New Towns Commission	H.U.D. Office of New Communities Development	variety but mainly FNAFU	D.U.R.D. New Cities Commission
type of program	integrated	integrated	sectoral	co-ordinated
context of policy	national policy	private initiation	regional policy	national/state policy

cont'd	Britain	United States	France	Australia
type of development organization	public development corporation	private developer	administrative council/private builders	development corporation/private developer
type of gov't support	loans & grants	loan guarantees & grants	loans	loans & grants
type of government involvement	public ownership of land, bldgs.	financial guarantees	land acquisition & servicing	land acquisition & servicing
types of new communities	a. satellite	a. satellite	a. satellite "close-in"	a. regional cities
	b. expanded	b. new towns-in-town	b. discontinued separated centres	b. system cities
		c. free standing growth centres		
		e. paired communities		
average size of new communities	30,000-250,000	10,000-150,000	100,000-600,000	10,000-250,000
number of new communities planned or completed	33 (1974)	63 private 16 HUD (1973)	9	7 (1974)
present populations	1,800,000 (1973)	-	-	443,000
target populations	3,725,000	865,900	3,465,000	1,963,000

cont'd	Britain	United States	France	Australia
total & commitment	\$2.4 billion (1971)	\$500 million loan guarantees from HUD	flexible part of regional plan commitments	\$69.7 million (1973-74)
per capita expenditure	\$44.14 (1971)	guarantees 0.53 (1972)	-	\$5.38 (1973-74)

6.2 Application to Canada

Some general comments may be made about the applicability of the foreign new community initiatives to Canada. For simplicity six areas of discussion are presented.

1. Goal Definition
2. Policy context
3. Type of New Community
4. Administrative Structure
5. Financing
6. Monitoring and Feedback

The following comments are not intended to reiterate the pitfalls or strengths of the foreign programs, for these have already been discussed in earlier sections of this paper. Rather this application section is intended only to suggest guidelines for framing future federal new community initiatives.

1. Goal Definition

(a) The examination of foreign initiatives in the new community field made explicit certain goals which were common to the programs of most countries. While all are not directly applicable to Canada, some are worthy of note.

- | | |
|-----------------------|---|
| Spatial Goals: | <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. elimination of sprawl, provision of alternative means by which growth may be restructured2. balancing the distribution of economic and demographic growth |
| Socio-Economic Goals: | <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. creation of socially and economically balanced communities |

2. minimization of commuting
3. increased efficiency in the urban use of public sector resources
4. stimulation of local economies and employment opportunities in depressed regions.

Environmental
Goals:

1. environmental preservation

Design Goals:

1. encouragement of innovation in new communities
2. maximization of urban aesthetics

Political
Goals:

1. encouragement of greater participation at all levels of government (formalized)
2. consistency of planning on national, provincial, regional, and local levels
3. creation of new communities as self-governing municipalities
4. strengthening of the capacity of state and local governments to deal with local problems.

Goal definition must be within the context of the geographical, socio-economic, environmental, and political realities which exist in Canada.

(b) The results of the British and French programs have indicated the need to make explicit all goals and objectives of new community policy. Furthermore there must be a basic understanding of how new community goals relate to other general and specific policy goals, in particular those goals relating to regional economic development. Where conflicts between goals appear to exist, priorities must be explicitly stated, i.e. goals must be weighted.

2. Policy Context

(a) New community policy cannot be treated as a single independent policy. Rather it must be considered within a more holistic policy framework, with greater understanding of how other policies may interact with new community initiatives.

(b) Because a decision at any level may have a potential impact on many programs, it is necessary that all policy be integrated/co-ordinated on an interagency scale at the federal level, and intergovernmentally with local, regional, and provincial urban growth management policies.

(c) New communities do not exist in a vacuum, but have significant impact on the immediate area around and on the region as a whole. Hence an integrated urban and regional approach is necessary.

(d) Policy for the redirection of growth should be implemented through both a positive and negative incentive system. Movement of activities and people should be voluntary, but encouraged through such incentives as land use controls, industrial subsidies, tax concessions, etc.

3. Type of New Community

(a) The British program overtime proved that new communities must be of a relatively sufficient size so as to be self-generating and supportive of a wide range of social and economic activities. The British program envisioned communities

of up to 250,000 people, the French from 100,000 to 600,000, etc. Smaller centres have also been relatively successful particularly where already existing towns are expanded. In determining what would be an optimal size of a new community in Canada the following criteria would need to be considered: spatial setting, degree of self-sufficiency, major management objective, (% of growth to be decentralized, etc.), type of new community.

(b) Sufficient flexibility in the design of new communities is needed so that plans may be adapted to local conditions. However general guidelines are necessary to ensure minimum development standards are met.

(c) New Communities may achieve social and economic balance. This was proven in both Britain and France. New settlements in Canada should provide diversified employment opportunities, a wide range of housing (both in type and price), and should aim at a relatively great degree of self-sufficiency in terms of providing employment for all working residents so as to minimize commuting (and hence investment in transportation facilities).

(d) While it is expected that secondary industry will be encouraged to provide jobs for new residents, it was proven in France that government activities, and educational institutions could help to provide tertiary employment as well.

If public sector activities are to be encouraged in canadian new communities, then decentralization will only be possible through a co-ordinated policy for growth.

4. Administrative Structure

(a) The most effective organizational structure to stage the implementation of the new communities initiatives appears to be the public development corporation. While in the United States new communities are planned and built by private developers, the problems involved in acquiring land in large mass without the necessary expropriating powers are formidable. The public development corporation represents a body which should be representative of all levels of government, as in Australia, and have powers to acquire and service land. The French, American, Australian and British programs have all reinforced the idea that housing and commercial facilities may be economically provided by the private sector. The Australian program in addition, illustrates the use of leasehold system for commercial and industrial use, a type land tenure which may have a potential for application in Canada.

(b) The British program has provided an efficient organization for the central control of new community programs but such an organization is not considered to be applicable to Canada due to the federal nature of the political system. In the same token, the French sectoral program poses problems of

accountability, securing of adequate funds, and otherwise administrative "red-tape" because of the many bodies involved in the process. The Australian approach promises the best alternative with a co-ordinated program intergovernmentally, and an integrated approach at the Commonwealth level. Depending on the amount and type of commitment by the federal and provincial authorities, and the degree to which new community programs are utilized in the growth management strategy, the most efficient and effective organization for the centralized control of new community initiatives for Canada appears to be in a co-ordinated body composed of national and provincial representatives and supported by its own technical advisory group.

5. Financing

(a) The earlier part of this paper illustrated the different methods and extent of financing for new communities in certain foreign countries. Britain provides loans and grants for the entire planning and implementation of new community projects. Grants are provided for community facilities, and loans are issued to finance the construction of commercial, industrial, and residential facilities, as well as the initial servicing of infrastructure. In the United States, support for new community initiatives is mainly through loan guarantees. The French program is one in which loans and grants are provided by numerous agencies for servicing and land acquisition, but not for building. Finally the Australian program is one in

which land acquisition is financed by the Commonwealth government but servicing is provided by the State governments.

(b) Under the present federal system in Canada, new communities could best be financed through a shared-cost scheme similar to that of Australia. Federal assistance could be provided in the form of direct loans and grants, or at least in the form of federal loan guarantees, and cover such areas as land acquisition, servicing, public housing, etc.

(c) Some of the costs could be transferred to the private sector - residential, commercial, industrial development costs.

(d) Loans and grants should be of sufficient size such that all the needs of the new community are met. Development should be financed so that a variety of facilities are provided from the outset.

(e) The most efficient means for delivering federal assistance appears to be through one central agency.

6. Monitoring and Feedback

(a) The American program has provided a good example of how initiatives could be established in prerequisite form. While this type of approach is particularly useful in the U.S. due to the private nature of the development process, it could

also have some potential for Canada. The main benefit derived from implementing a detailed application process for any loans or grants is the assurance that various dimensions will be taken into account during the planning and preplanning process. The main deterrant is the additional cost that are incurred as a result of development delay. What is apparent is that the conventional administrative procedures presently in use at the provincial and federal levels are not suitable for the large scale projects that are characteristic of new town developments. A separate application process, administered by an intergovernmental body, could help to streamline the new community development process.

(b) Finally, in the countries of this study, quantitative targets were set to guide new community officials in evaluating the progress of programs (e.g. housing completions, industrial floor space, etc.). In France both quantitative and qualitative criteria were used. Such a monitoring technique could be of value in Canada and provide up-to-date information on development progress. A comprehensive data set composed of selected indicators could also have potential for a continuous feedback system to aid in other new community projects.

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